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THE EMERGENCE OF THE HYBRID PEACE  
Heidi Mõttus  
Abstract  
Liberal peacebuilding continues to be the most dominant form of peacebuilding today. 
Yet, liberal peace practices have not always resulted in a sustainable peace and critical 
approaches to the liberal peace have emerged, which concentrate on how the liberal peace 
asserts itself in local contexts and how the emerging liberal-local interactions are able to 
transform the peace. One such concept is that of the hybrid peace, which combines liberal 
and emancipatory peacebuilding practices. While the concept of the hybrid peace is 
generally well understood, its theoretical framework is underdeveloped and although 
some scholars have suggested that the hybrid peace could be understood as a new 
generation in peacebuilding, conditions surrounding its emergence remain unclear. If the 
hybrid peace is to become a new generation in peacebuilding, greater clarity is needed for 
understanding whether it could be implemented from the outset in peacebuilding 
operations. This thesis seeks to enhance the current theoretical framework by suggesting 
a three-pillar model and a distinction between a more positive type of hybridity, the 
inclusive hybrid peace and a more negative exclusive hybrid peace. The three-pillar 
model is then used to comparatively analyse peace agreements and post-conflict peace 
processes in the case studies of Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Northern Ireland and 
Timor-Leste using indicators to measure the extent to which each pillar is represented in 
the documents. The findings suggest variance in the way in which the three pillars are 
represented in the case studies. The more adherence there is to the three pillars in the 
peace agreements as well as in implementation phases, the more likely inclusive hybrid 
peace becomes. Nevertheless, the findings also suggest that an inclusive hybrid peace is 
a difficult concept to implement, especially in violent ethnic conflicts that result in 
consociational power-sharing agreements, which tend to entrench ethnic divisions. A 
greater focus on bottom-up approaches in peacebuilding can foster reconciliation, 
especially at the grassroots level. However, at the level of implementation, the hybrid 
peace as a concept remains problematic.   
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Introduction  
The international peacebuilding project1 has arrived at a point, where its current form 
continues to be practiced by the United Nations (UN) and its members amidst a growing 
amount of criticisms related to its inefficiency and lack of legitimacy. Peacebuilding as it 
is understood today relies on peace being achieved externally, i.e. the UN becomes 
responsible for peacekeeping in a post-conflict society and establishes measures for 
building democratic institutions through state-building. The peacebuilding agenda is 
practiced by liberal, usually Western states and encompasses missions in post-conflict 
settings all over the world, involving thousands of military and civilian staff. These liberal 
peacebuilding practices have, for the most part, managed to reduce post-conflict violence 
and establish some compliance in post-conflict societies with liberal institutions, but the 
overall record has been mixed. If understood simply as the ‘absence of violence’, then 
peace has indeed been achieved in a number of intrastate conflicts. This narrow definition, 
however, does little to address the root causes of the conflict. The aims of the liberal peace 
have, of course, not been to merely achieve an absence of violence or, in other words, a 
negative peace. The state-building component has attempted to address the sustainability 
of the peace by introducing democratic governance, however this is what has garnered 
the most amount of criticism: these practices have not always resulted in a sustainable 
peace. The current peacebuilding agenda is concerned with the establishment and 
maintenance of state institutions rather than reconciliation. It considers itself as 
universally applicable to a variety of settings and is usually administered in a top-down 
fashion, with limited input from the local actors. The implementation of liberal peace 
practices has often resulted in fragile states that are unable to govern themselves 
effectively and rely on the international presence for support. This, in turn, means that 
while the violence may have been stopped, the peace is not able to sustain itself. These 
developments have prompted scholars to look beyond the liberal peace and identify a new 
development in post-conflict societies: the hybrid peace. Hybridity in peacebuilding 
refers to a combination of internal and external peacebuilding processes, which interact 
to produce new forms of peace. As a concept, hybrid peace has been noted to emerge in 
various cases that have been subjected to external intervention in peacebuilding, however 
                                                          
1 International peacebuilding was defined by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in the 1992 Agenda for Peace as “an 
action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid 
relapse into conflict”. 
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the development of a coherent theoretical model has not achieved extensive attention and 
empirical studies on the topic are confined to a few single case studies. Yet, in the context 
of peacebuilding, hybrid peace is important since it combines the international and the 
local. Because current understandings of peacebuilding are devised using Western 
understandings but usually implemented outside of the Western hemisphere, studying an 
approach that is able to transcend the top-down nature of the liberal peace and develop 
more inclusive understandings in peacebuilding, could be of enormous benefit to the 
success of future peacebuilding missions. While the idea that the hybrid peace might 
indeed have the potential to form a new generation in peacebuilding has been cautiously 
touched upon in peacebuilding literature, it is still unclear whether the hybrid peace has 
the potential to do this. There is conceptual understanding in terms of what the hybrid 
peace is and where it can be observed but the theoretical framework is underdeveloped. 
If hybrid peace is to be understood not as something that emerges spontaneously in a 
number of post-conflict settings, but as a phenomenon that could stand on its own, greater 
understanding is needed on the causes and the roots of the concept. If the current 
peacebuilding agenda is criticised for its lack of legitimacy and efficiency, is it time for a 
new approach that is able to transcend these shortcomings? Could hybrid peace become 
a new model upon which future peacebuilding efforts could be built?  
The aim of this thesis, therefore, is to examine whether the hybrid peace could be 
understood as a new form of peacebuilding and a foundation for a new generation of 
understanding in how peace should be achieved in post-conflict societies. In order to do 
this, I first enhance the current theoretical understanding of the hybrid peace by 
suggesting a model, the three pillars of the hybrid peace, which are comprised of 
democracy, justice and legitimacy. These three pillars illustrate the ‘in-between’ form of 
the hybrid peace, situating it between the liberal peace and more emancipatory 
understandings. In addition, I argue that the hybrid peace is not a homogenous concept in 
that while hybrid forms of peace can emerge in a variety of settings, the peace in some 
cases is more sustainable than in others and the way in which it has been implemented 
can also differ, from very rigid, top-down implementation practices to practices that place 
greater emphasis on reducing tensions within the society. Therefore, I distinguish 
between two forms of the hybrid peace, the exclusive and the inclusive. The more top-
down and narrow the peacebuilding process, the more likely it is that the peace will lean 
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towards an exclusive form. Secondly, the empirical part of the thesis uses the theoretical 
framework to develop an understanding of how the hybrid peace emerges and seeks to 
answer two research questions: 1) To what extent are the three pillars of the hybrid peace 
represented in the peace agreements of the case studies in question? 2) To what extent are 
the three pillars of the hybrid peace represented in the implementation phases of the case 
studies in question? I developed indicators for each of the three pillars in order to measure 
representation. While most studies on the hybrid peace have so far used single cases 
studies, the thesis is a comparative study that seeks to identify patterns across cases.  
The thesis begins by introducing the theoretical framework, which is based on the 
most prominent form of peacebuilding, the liberal peace. The theoretical framework also 
introduces the hybrid peace and its theoretical foundations. Secondly, the research design 
and methodology are described. Thirdly, the thesis provides an overview of the conflicts 
in four of the selected case studies: Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Northern 
Ireland and Timor-Leste2 and their road towards the signing of the peace agreements. 
This is followed by the empirical analysis chapter. The first part of the empirical analysis 
focuses on assessing the peace agreements of the case studies according to the three pillars 
of the hybrid peace, the results of which are discussed in interim findings. The second 
part of the empirical analysis looks at the way in which the peace agreements were 
implemented, again using the three pillars model. The analysis concludes with a 
discussion. The findings of the thesis are summarised in a conclusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 This thesis uses the Portuguese name Timor-Leste, derived from the Democratic Republic of Timor-
Leste, which is the official name of the state. East Timor is used when it is included in the title of a 
document, in a direct quote or is part of a name of an organisation.  
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1 Theoretical framework  
As the ultimate goal of peacebuilding, peace itself is difficult define. Yet, before taking 
on the complex task of identifying how contemporary peacebuilding operates, the 
underlying theoretical background of peace can provide important insight into how 
peacebuilding has evolved. It should be noted that while the thesis acknowledges the 
valuable contributions to peacebuilding made by non-Western approaches, the theoretical 
perspective in this case rests mostly on Western understandings. This choice was made 
for two reasons. Firstly, the Western contribution has so far been the most influential in 
shaping the way peacebuilding is understood and implemented in post-conflict settings. 
Secondly, the post-Cold War security framework is based upon the liberal peace, the 
central framework used by leading, mostly Western states and institutions who engage in 
peacebuilding operations. Nevertheless, critical approaches along with more indigenous 
understandings of peacebuilding have emerged and are increasingly becoming more 
influential. These approaches are challenging the prevailing assumptions in peacebuilding 
today and are reflected upon in more detail when the thesis comes to discuss its central 
concept of the hybrid peace.  
As noted before, peace is not an easy concept to define. It is, however, possible to 
distinguish between ’negative’ and ’positive’ peace. A negative peace suggests the 
absence of war or conflict. The violence has ended but the root causes of the conflict have 
not been addressed. Within societies, negative peace suggests the domination of one 
group over another. This type of peace depends on power relations between groups and 
is not sustainable since structural violence in domestic structures is still present 
(Richmond, 2014: 7). A positive peace, on the other hand, indicates the absence of 
violence as well as the absence of structural violence in the prevailing political system. 
Positive peace is characterised by stability in society and provides security guarantees to 
the general populations. It follows a view that suggests that not conflict but peace is 
inherent in human nature and can be provided by states and institutions. It seeks to be 
inclusive and meet the needs of all groups (Richmond, 2014: 11). The achievement of 
such a peace in contemporary societies that have emerged from conflict remains a difficult 
task.  
 The way we understand peace today is dominated by the liberal peace. 
Contemporary peacebuilding, in turn, rests on the collective international security 
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framework set in the 1945 UN Charter. This framework has been institutionalised in the 
form of the liberal peace, emphasising democracy and human rights, and utilising the 
means of intervention if deemed necessary (Chandler, 2004: 60). As a theoretical 
approach, the liberal peace challenges both the Realist approaches, which emphasise the 
emergence of conflict as a result of shifts in the balance of power in an anarchic world 
and the English School, which concentrates on equality among a society of states without 
considering their domestic political system. Proponents of the liberal peace, on the other 
hand, advocate the achievement of peace through the promotion of democratic and human 
rights practices. This prominent view is centred on the premise that liberal states are more 
likely to be peaceful than illiberal states. Drawing from Kant and the democratic peace 
theory, this understanding of peace is the most prominent and preferred among Western 
societies (Joshi et al, 2014: 366). As a result, the leading role in ensuring that this 
framework is achieved is taken by democratic, usually Western states who rest their 
approach on linking moral authority with political legitimacy (Chandler, 2004: 60). 
Although the liberal piece is by far the most dominant form of peacebuilding, authors 
such as Chandler (2010), Mac Ginty (2008, 2010), Zaum (2012) and Richmond (2010) to 
name a few have argued that the liberal peace is not unproblematic. The main criticism 
points to the practice’s overly top-down nature and unwillingness to ensure that the peace 
is not only legitimate globally but also locally.  
To address the shortcomings of the liberal peace, critical approaches that suggest 
alternative forms of peace have emerged and identified a peacebuilding paradigm that 
combines external and internal peacebuilding processes (Mac Ginty, 2010: 392). 
Acknowledging that contemporary forms of peace are often a complex combination of 
both local and international efforts is not new. However, an important contribution made 
by scholars suggesting alternative approaches has been the conceptualisation of hybrid 
forms of peace in post-conflict societies. Scholars focusing on hybridity in peacebuilding 
have examined the interactions between global norms and the local agency3 in producing 
new forms of peace that challenge the traditional, top-down approaches that characterise 
liberal peacebuilding. While the focus of the current scholarship on establishing and 
expanding the conceptual literature on how the local agencies respond to liberal 
                                                          
3 “Local actors” or the “local agency” refer to the range of actors that are engaged in peacebuilding and 
reconciliation at the local level. The local in this sense does not necessarily refer to actors who are non-
liberal but rather the political and civil society counterparts to international actors.  
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peacebuilding efforts, the origins and emergence of the hybrid peace remain unclear. 
Thus, the thesis aims to tackle this issue.  
 
1.1 The liberal peace framework   
While it is possible to identify multiple accounts of peacebuilding, mainstream liberal 
understandings focus on the establishment of liberal institutions and privatisation 
practices (Visoka, 2012: 23). Liberal peacebuilding, therefore, is a way of establishing 
the liberal peace in conflict settings, which is then externally introduced and top-down in 
design (Richmond, 2014: 98). The liberal peace components that the peacebuilders strive 
towards in post-conflict societies include ensuring the rule of law and building liberal-
democratic institutions based on good governance, human rights and a market economy 
(Joshi et al, 2014: 266; Zaum, 2012: 121). As noted by Herring (cited in Mac Ginty, 2010: 
393), other core values associated with the liberal peace place emphasis on ‘the freedom 
of expression and association’ and ‘equality of opportunity’. Richmond (2006a: 295) 
argues that the liberal peace employs a communicative strategy through which it proposes 
reforms and which is dependent on the degree of legitimacy it has achieved in the 
receiving society. As a strategy, the liberal peace presupposes the successful 
implementation of each of its core components. This has been emphasised by Doyle 
(2005) who has advocated the ‘three pillars’ approach. According to Doyle (2005: 463), 
these pillars are comprised of three components: “republican representation, an 
ideological commitment to fundamental human rights and transnational 
interdependence”. In this understanding of the liberal peace, lasting and sustainable peace 
can only be achieved through adherence to all three of these components. Commercial 
interdependence through free markets sustains cooperation among states, while the 
implementation of human rights norms is made possible only in the presence of 
transparent democratic representation (Doyle, 2005: 463-464). What is more, because the 
liberal peace emphasises individual rights and the freedom of speech, adopting these 
principles can potentially increase international respect for the recipient (Doyle, 2005: 
464). Failing to implement these components would thus curtail the development of a 
positive peace. Yet, the liberal peace is underpinned by an assumption of universality, an 
understanding that it is applicable to a great variety of settings emerging from conflict. 
These assumptions about peace constitute a form of orientalism, where those 
12 
 
knowledgeable about peace create it for those who are not (Richmond, 2006a: 308). The 
liberal peace as a discourse is seen to be unproblematic by its proponents and issues within 
its methodological approaches are usually attributed to the receiving end not 
implementing the liberal reforms vigorously enough. This exercise in hegemony is thus 
dependent on the goals and objectives of the actors involved. Moreover, the liberal peace 
forms a framework, which is based on a consensus that this particular form of peace 
should be replicated in order to achieve states that are characterised by a market economy, 
the rule of law, democracy and human rights along with the presence of an active civil 
society. Since the end of the Cold War, this understanding has been applied to all UN and 
non-UN peacebuilding efforts (Richmond, 2006b: 380). The liberal peace is comprised 
of multiple discourses and has its foundations in the main theories of International 
Relations. As mentioned previously, distinction can be made between liberal peace as 
strands of thought and liberal peace as a model. Richmond provides a useful framework 
for distinguishing between four main types of thought: the victor’s peace, the 
constitutional peace, the institutional peace and the civil peace.  
 The victor’s peace is based on the argument that peace prevails following a victory 
by a hegemonic actor (Richmond, 2006b: 381). It follows a realist argument that a 
military victory is more likely to lead to a long-lasting peace (Richmond and Franks, 
2008: 187). It is a form of negative peace and results in a fragile state that maintains a 
form of order until the victor is able to maintain its power (Richmond, 2014: 52). The 
victor’s peace is one of the oldest strands in peace literature and authors such as 
Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes have discussed its merits in their major works. This 
form of thinking is highly dependent on power relations and assumes that the hegemon 
has the right to exercise power (Richmond, 2014: 57). Contemporary forms of the victor’s 
peace can be observed in the cases of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 
bombing campaigns against Serbia in BiH in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999. In these cases, 
the campaigns were justified by referring to the immense violence and suffering in each 
of the conflicts and the need to establish peaceful, democratic states. Because the victor’s 
peace favours the victor, a major problem of this strand of thought in intrastate conflicts 
is its lack of legitimacy in the local context. While it might provide grounds for 
establishing a liberal peace framework in the society, there are always groups that are 
either excluded from the process or included but not to the same extent as the victor. This, 
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in turn, can lead to calls for self-determination from certain groups and can provide 
incentives for an external patron state to promote its own agenda. Moreover, since the 
victor’s peace depends on the hegemon maintaining its power, it is not likely to be self-
sustainable.  
The central argument within the constitutional peace is that of the democratic 
peace (Richmond, 2006b: 381). The key characteristics of the constitutional peace are 
based on the Kantian notion of the perpetual peace and include democracy, free trade and 
the idea that the populations of states should be understood as ends rather than means 
(Richmond and Franks, 2008: 187; Richmond, 2014: 62). The idea for the constitutional 
peace emerged during the Enlightenment period, when the classically realist view of war 
being inevitable began to be contested and included the notion of law and legitimate 
institutions being necessary for the achievement of peace. The contemporary democratic 
peace theory has its foundations in Kant’s ideas, which he described in his book Perpetual 
Peace. According to Kant, peace can be achieved if laws exist in a democratic political 
society. In addition, free trade is considered to be an important part of the constitutional 
peace (Richmond, 2014: 62). Contemporary understandings of the liberal peace are based 
on several key tenets of the perpetual peace, including the establishment of democratic 
institutions, the rule of law and a market economy. While the argument that democracies 
do not tend to fight democracies seems to hold, the constitutional peace rests on the 
assumption that democratic governments can be introduced to a variety of post-conflict 
settings when on many occasions, the resulting democratic representation remains flawed 
and the human rights of all groups within the society are not respected. Nevertheless, the 
constitutional peace remains central to the liberal peace framework.  
The institutional peace rests on the idea that states should organise themselves 
multilaterally and develop an institutional framework for behaviour based on a set of 
normative and legal principles (Richmond, 2006b: 381). International law and 
international institutions support the development of the constitutional peace. The 
institutional peace not only operates within a normative and legal context but also expects 
states to enforce the same behaviour on states that are not part of this institutional 
framework (Richmond, 2014: 67). An important component of the institutional peace is 
the role of international law as it is seen to lead to stability in the international order. The 
institutional peace can be seen as one of the goals of UN-led peace operations since 
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elements such as democracy, human rights, the market economy and civil society should 
be represented in international treaties and relevant domestic documentation (Richmond, 
2014: 122). If states share common goals and adhere to the same values and principles, 
then the maintenance of a stable international order is more likely. Likeminded states 
following liberal norms and legal principles would form the international community 
(Richmond, 2014: 68). Nowadays, international institutions play a key role in advocating 
the liberal peace agenda and introducing liberal norms and values to societies emerging 
from conflict.  
The final strand of thought, the civil peace, emphasises the idea that in order to 
prevent and mitigate conflict and violence, a vibrant civil society is needed (Richmond, 
2006: 381). In this strand of peace, the central focus is on human rights attainment 
(Richmond and Franks, 2008: 187). The civil peace represents a positive form of peace 
in which individuals organise themselves through social mobilisation to achieve peace. 
The role of the civil society is crucial to the development of peace as it allows the 
international peacebuilding actors to take into account the needs and interests of the local 
context (Richmond, 2014: 79). As part of the liberal peace framework, international actors 
welcome civil societies that represent and develop areas related to its own agenda and 
many civil society organisations in post-conflict societies promote gender equality, 
human rights, economic development and the eradication of poverty and so forth. 
However, not all civil society actors are interested in peace. Some advocate for the 
exploitation of certain socio-economic groups and have also faced criticism for advancing 
state rather interests rather than those of individuals in society (Richmond, 2014: 88). The 
civil peace has nevertheless become an important component of the liberal peace, which 
is increasingly more bottom-up than top-down. This, in turn, means that the civil society 
and local advocacy have played an important role in the emerging form of the hybrid 
peace.   
The victor’s peace has largely remained a key component in the liberal peace 
discourse. Even types of peace that take a more emancipatory approach rest on the 
assumption that peace needs to be installed to conflict settings (Richmond, 2006a: 296). 
The top-down approaches to peacebuilding, even in cases, where the achievement of a 
civil peace has been a top priority, tend to focus on state institution-building, which can 
undermine the local capacity (Richmond, 2006a: 298). Non-state actors and 
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organisations, therefore, provide an opportunity for the liberal peace to promote its norms 
since it is in the interest of the international peacebuilders that the liberal norms are 
accepted and promoted.  
 
1.1.1 The diffusion of norms in liberal peace  
The way in which international norms are promoted by international actors in post-
conflict settings sheds light on how the liberal peacebuilding agenda is able to exert its 
influence (Björkdahl and Gusic, 2015: 267). International peacebuilding today can be 
characterised as a form of norms diffusion in which ‘global’ norms are underpinned by 
the assumption of universality and thus transferred to post-conflict societies as part of the 
liberal peace. A key factor in any peacebuilding operation is institution-building and the 
way in which post-conflict societies respond to institutional change as part of the liberal 
peace agenda depends on how successfully the liberal peace norms are either accepted or 
rejected by the recipients. Institutions in this sense are understood as social structures and 
systems of rules, while organisations are formal institutions with written regulations for 
appropriate behaviour (Börzel and Risse, 2012: 4).  
Diffusion can be defined as a way in which ideas, policies, institutions, practices 
spread across social and political spaces (Börzel and Risse, 2012: 5). Existing literature 
on norms diffusion and institutional change has suggested that the more recipient states 
are able to adapt to and cooperate with institution-building measures, the more likely 
behavioural compliance becomes. Institutional designs that are copied from different 
contexts can be problematic in terms of compliance (Börzel and Risse, 2012: 4). The 
receiving agency are not passive actors and the appliance of various institutional measures 
in regional contexts can generate both incorporation of new rules and regulations but also 
resistance (Börzel and Risse, 2012: 8). Partly effective institutions and a lack of local 
compliance that have emerged as a result of liberal peacebuilding lead to a hybrid form 
of peace. The liberal peace has been observed to react to barriers to liberal norms diffusion 
by intervening. The end goal is to ‘free’ societies from their ignorance so that they would 
realise the merits of choosing liberal norms (Chandler, 2013: 217). As argued by Diez 
(2013: 201), norms and interests cannot be separated: norms shape interests and interests 
shape norms. In this setting, the non-liberal becomes ’exotic’ and ’backward’. As has 
been established, norms promotion is likely to encounter setbacks from the receiving 
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societies and therefore operates by imposing institutional behaviour changes through 
incentives or conditionality. This type of statebuilding has not only been utilised by the 
European Union but by every major international institution, including the United 
Nations. However, how we understand the application of norms diffusion in 
peacebuilding can also be problematic. Theorising from this angle suggests a division 
between the ‘liberal’ and the ‘non-liberal’ or the ‘international’ and the ‘local’. The 
emphasis here is on the agency and how it chooses to reproduce norms (Chandler, 2013: 
229). The liberal extends liberal norms and the non-liberal chooses to reproduce non-
liberal norms. Norms promotion research and critique thus either sees the diffusion of 
norms either as imposing its own approaches to the non-liberal setting or the recipient 
agency as resisting, which should merit our acceptance and understanding (Chandler, 
2013: 229). Nevertheless, liberal norms diffusion in peacebuilding results in interactions 
between the various actors involved and the degree of behavioural compliance to 
institution-building measures can determine the extent to which the peace remains 
inclusive and self-sustainable. Although referring to EU institutions, Börzel and Risse 
(2012: 12) develop a similar argument and note that the more fragile the state, the less 
likely it is that sustainable institutional change through norms diffusion is achieved. The 
success with which norms diffuse in peacebuilding is similarly dependent on the various 
understandings and practices already present in the local setting.  
 
1.1.2 Critiques on liberal peacebuilding  
The prominence of liberal approaches in contemporary peacebuilding has resulted in the 
development of a number critiques. These responses to the liberal peace have noted that 
peacebuilding has concentrated on building liberal institutions, free markets and societies 
rather than focusing their main goal on conflict resolution and prevention (Bellamy cited 
in Chandler, 2010a: 138). The Western liberal peace models that above all emphasise the 
creation of democratic institutions characterised by human rights and a free market 
economy run the risk of ignoring the situation on the ground, where the recipients of the 
peacebuilding project have their own interests. While the liberal peace can indeed ensure 
that peace is achieved, it also contributes towards maintaining the status quo of frictional 
encounters between groups, populations and states. As noted by Chandler (2010a: 138), 
through its universalising activities, the liberal peace can effectively undermine its own 
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agenda of achieving a sustainable peace. This refers to the problem of ignoring the needs 
of those subjected to peacebuilding, which can lead to inequalities and the maintenance 
of narratives from the conflict period, curtailing reconciliation and the effective 
functioning of institutions. Therefore, the liberal peace can occasionally drive itself 
towards undesirable outcomes.  
While critiques on liberal peacebuilding have accepted that the liberal peace is not 
an unproblematic concept, they have approached the topic from various angles. Similarly 
to authors such as Chandler (2010a), Lemay-Hebert (2013) and Selby (2013), I suggest 
two broad frameworks for distinguishing between the different critiques. Firstly, the 
problem-solving critiques investigate how the liberal peace operates on the ground, its 
shortcomings and attempts at improving its performance. For example, Paris (cited in 
Selby, 2013: 63) argues that the liberal peace has often introduced its practices too 
rapidly, which has led to difficulties on the ground. Thus in Paris’ view, to improve the 
functioning of liberal institutions, the liberal peace should focus on building strong 
institutions and avoid withdrawing the peacebuilding mission too early. Such critiques 
are concerned with relapses into violence and aim to improve the functioning of liberal 
institutions. In another piece, Paris (2010: 343) also addresses the various critiques of 
liberal peacebuilding, noting that as a result of the critiques, the liberal peacebuilders are 
in a difficult position: they are expected to increase the duration of the peacebuilding 
operations to provide support in the development of democratic institutions and at the 
same time, not intrude excessively in the local practices and understandings.  
Secondly, the values-based critiques, as suggested by the term itself, are 
concerned with the values associated with the liberal peace and argue that the character 
of the liberal peace is comprised of hegemonic power relations. In the view of those 
arguing within this group, the Western conceptualisation of peacebuilding allows little 
room for the discourses of those subjected to intervention. These critiques are related to 
Chandler’s (2005: 308) arguments on ‘peace without politics’. Using BiH as an example, 
the author argues that the international community tends to view state-building as 
separated from politics. In this view, peacebuilding is an administrative process and does 
not take into account the needs of the society that is being to subjected to peacebuilding, 
being instead led by international actors (Chandler, 2006: 308). Therefore, this approach 
assumes that by initiating reforms in law and administration, the problem of politics will 
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also be solved and establish “good governance without democratic participatory politics” 
(Chandler, 2006: 311). Thus, Chandler’s critique is also connected to that of legitimacy: 
the processes led by the international peacebuilders are not concerned with whether the 
institution-building practices are creating locally legitimate institutions that give a voice 
to a variety of local actors. This, in turn, can hinder the development of the peace.  
When critiquing any peacebuilding effort, it is important to consider the extent to 
which conflict resolution between states and populations is present (Chandler, 2010a: 
138). The peacebuilding operation should strive towards a peace that is self-sustainable, 
able to function independently and without outside interference. The liberal peace 
remains the dominant and preferred form of peacebuilding today and while it has serious 
shortcomings, it is also currently the most sophisticated form of peacebuilding. While 
scholars have started to explore approaches that could go beyond the liberal peace and 
are ‘post-liberal’ in essence, no serious attempt has so far been made to devise an 
alternative that could address the absence of self-sustainability of peace in many post-
conflict societies. Conceptual foundations have been made, however, that have the 
potential to reshape the way contemporary peacebuilding is understood in both theoretical 
and practical terms.  
 
1.2 The conceptual framework of the hybrid peace  
One of the most prominent critical approaches to have emerged to the liberal peace is the 
hybrid peace, which offers an alternative approach to conceptualising peacebuilding in 
post-conflict settings. It is a combination of the internal and external, where local and 
international actors interact and produce new forms of peace. This mediation is dependent 
on the diffusion of liberal norms to a post-conflict setting as all international norms exert 
their influence through a filter of domestic structures (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 
893). How successfully these norms have managed to penetrate the local societies and 
how well the local agency has responded is important for understanding how interactions 
between the international and the local produce hybridity.  
The concept of the hybrid peace also has its foundations in emancipatory peace, 
which is concerned with the nature of progress in societies. Emancipatory approaches set 
their focus “from below”, rather than from above and consider the local agency as crucial 
to the peacebuilding process (Leonardsson and Rudd, 2015: 831-832). An emancipatory 
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peace enables such aspects as rights, security and access to public services for the 
populations subjected to peacebuilding (Visoka and Richmond, 2017: 113). 
Emancipatory peace focuses on enablement rather than intervention, which recognises 
local needs, rights and practices and reconciles local, state and international norms to 
produce democratic and legitimate forms of peace (Visoka and Richmond, 2017: 113). 
Although several critical scholars have studied how those subjected to intervention 
interact with the external peacebuilders, the central conceptual framework of the hybrid 
peace is based on the works of Mac Ginty (2008, 2009, 2010) and Richmond (2008, 2010, 
2015).  
The conceptual scope of the hybrid peace is extensive, however, scholars who 
have contributed to this strand of literature have largely avoided going beyond noting that 
a hybrid form of peace is present. In his 2010 article on the conceptualisation of the hybrid 
peace, Mac Ginty maintains a cautious stance and notes that the goal of his article is not 
to advocate a form of peacebuilding but to provide an overview of a condition that is 
present in the real world. Richmond (2010: 668) uses the term ‘post-liberal’ peace to talk 
about the move towards a willingness to take the local context into account and notes that 
this approach denotes a more realistic understanding of the various agencies in 
peacebuilding and the development of institutional designs. Both authors recognise the 
dangers of romanticising the local. Mac Ginty (2008: 149) notes that a move towards the 
local or indigenous in peacebuilding should not automatically be taken to mean ‘good’ or 
as having a higher normative value. The author goes on to argue that rather than assuming 
that local approaches are somehow better than their liberal counterparts, any 
peacebuilding approach should be fit for purpose and undergo tests to judge their 
relevancy, although he does not provide any further examples on how or in what context 
these tests should be conducted. According to Richmond (2010: 669), a positive hybrid 
peace is characterised by representative institutions and forms of statehood that are locally 
inclusive. The peace that emerges as a result of this is therefore neither wholly liberal nor 
exclusively local, but characterised by an ‘in-betweenness’. It is hybrid, in the sense that 
the security interests of a range of actors are taken into account (Richmond, 2014: 106). 
As a new form of peacebuilding, a hybrid peace includes the rule of law, inclusive 
political institutions, security and human rights. If the hybrid peace can develop further 
to represent a new generation in peacebuilding history, these components will remain an 
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important part of its framework. In addition, local contributions, especially in the form of 
the civil society, and relations within groups in post-conflict societies can shed light on 
the local context, which has become increasingly important in terms of legitimacy. 
Drawing from these conceptual understandings and Doyle’s model of the three pillars of 
the liberal peace, which was discussed earlier, I suggest a three-pillar model for the hybrid 
peace (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: The three pillars of the hybrid peace. (Source: author) 
 
The three pillars represent the ‘in-betweenness’ of the hybrid peace, bringing together the 
liberal peace and the emancipatory peace. Pillars I and II refer to such components as 
democratic representation, the rule of law and human rights, all necessary for the 
successful functioning of peace. Pillar III draws from emancipatory discourses and is 
concerned with the local context: are community rights respected, are conscious efforts 
being made to foster reconciliation, including locally induced practices, and does the civil 
society have a voice? These three pillars work together to create a hybrid form of peace, 
which aims to be sustainable and legitimate both globally and locally. The model provides 
a framework through which to assess the potential emergence of the hybrid peace and to 
assess future possibilities of utilising the hybrid peace in a peacebuilding operation. As 
argued by Belloni (2012: 23), the local context should not be viewed as being 
incompatible with the liberal. The aim of the three pillars of the hybrid peace is not to 
counter the liberal peace but to provide a model that takes into account the interests of the 
various actors involved.  
As noted by Richmond (2010: 669), moving beyond the hegemonic discourses 
represented by the liberal peace should not denote the end for the liberal peace but enable 
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those subjected to peacebuilding interact with it in a variety of contexts. Local actors 
interact with international actors and often support the liberal peace framework and its 
components, while at the same time arguing for them to be applied to the specific context 
(Richmond, 2014: 115). Therefore, liberal-local interactions can either be successful and 
characterised by cooperation between the actors or there can also be resistance between 
liberal-local actors and frictional encounters between local-local actors. The concept of 
‘friction’ was introduced by Björkdahl and Höglund (2013: 292) who conceptualise it as 
a process that emerges when the global and the local engage in conflictual encounters and 
is related to how liberal norms change through their diffusion in societies subjected to 
peacebuilding. Björkdahl and Höglund (2013: 290) argue that frictional encounters do 
not necessarily lead to negative outcomes when it comes to the long-term sustainability 
of the peace and can even inspire change in stagnant post-conflict societies. However, 
due to the asymmetric power relations between the external peacebuilders and the local 
agency, it is unlikely that the local context is able to pursue its own agenda to a significant 
extent. Furthermore, the complicated relations between the local actors contribute to 
fragmentation at the local agency level. Friction at this level is more likely to hinder the 
sustainability of the peace as internal divisions are difficult to overcome.  
What is clear is that the capacity of the local should not be romanticised 
(Richmond, 2010: 669). There are, however, voices speaking against the ‘in-
betweenness’ of the hybrid peace. For example, contrary to Mac Ginty, Richmond (2010: 
682) takes a conscious stance in favour of emancipatory peace. In his view, if 
emancipation is the goal of peacebuilding, then peacebuilding should be the domain of 
the local and not the international. If the peacebuilding processes are led by international 
actors advocating the liberal peace, the local agency is more likely to resist. Compliance, 
on the other hand, is likely to be higher when the local needs are taken into account. While 
this thesis argues from the viewpoint that hybridity should be understood as a global-local 
‘in-between’ form, a combination of liberal and emancipatory understandings of peace, 
Richmond’s understanding nevertheless suggests variance in the hybrid peace and merits 
further discussion.  
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1.2.1 Inclusive and exclusive hybrid peace  
The previous discussion in the thesis suggests that the more inclusive the peacebuilding 
effort, the more likely it is that a hybrid peace that is characterised by emancipation and 
inclusion will emerge. In other words, if there is a lack of legitimacy, the third pillar in 
my analysis, the success of achieving a sustainable peace becomes less likely. Yet, the 
discussion on these developments or the potential for their emergence in the current 
literature does not account for this variance sufficiently. As discussed previously, the 
general consensus among hybrid peace scholars is that due to the dominance of Western, 
liberal approaches to peacebuilding, hybridity emerges when liberal forms of 
peacebuilding interact and combine with local understandings. The current literature on 
the hybrid peace does not for the most part, however, go beyond stating that local-liberal 
interactions in peacebuilding can lead to hybridity and identifying that unless a 
peacebuilding effort encourages the local aspect to take a more active role instead of being 
passive recipients, a sustainable peace cannot be achieved. How the emergence of hybrid 
can be traced and why the hybrid peace has yielded more positive results in some cases 
and remained mostly characterised by a negative outcome in others have not been 
thoroughly researched and a clear distinction between the two factors has not been made. 
This thesis suggests conceptualizing the hybrid peace through a model, which 
distinguishes between inclusive and exclusive hybridity. Simply put, the more top-down 
practices prevail, the more exclusive the hybridity. The more bottom-up practices are 
included, the more inclusive the hybridity. It should be noted here that conceptualising 
the hybrid peace in terms of its inclusiveness or exclusiveness does run the risk of 
reproducing the same binary the concept’s “in-betweenness” is trying to avoid (Millar, 
2017: 294). Namely, there are similarities with Galtung’s negative/positive framework 
and indeed, Richmond (2015: 51) uses the framework to describe what he calls the 
“positive hybrid peace”. Galtung’s framework conceptualises peace as either absence of 
conflict, often with the remaining presence of structural violence or as emancipation, civil 
and human rights or democratic institutions (Richmond, 2006: 386). Since in this 
framework peace can only be understood as either positive or negative, it uses a simple 
binary to describe a complex phenomenon that is peace. It, therefore, retains a fixed 
sociocultural understanding of the liberal and the non-liberal (Chandler, 2014: 39). Yet, 
while recognising the shortcomings of the framework is important, the positive/negative 
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paradigm can nevertheless provide a useful backdrop against which future research on 
the hybrid peace can be based.  
As mentioned previously, although being critical of the framework, Richmond 
(2014, 2015) utilised it in his own works to describe a ‘positive’ hybrid peace, one that 
gets both external support and local input and thus enjoys both local and international 
legitimacy. A hybrid peace where international peacebuilders are unable to promote their 
best practices and transform the societies is described as a ‘negative’ hybrid peace. This 
theoretical backdrop provides clarity but does not allow us to move beyond the current 
peacebuilding framework. Hybrid peace should be understood as an approach to 
peacebuilding that takes into account the diversity of post-conflict settings and a 
particular local context, the current understandings of transitions from conflict to peace, 
the inequalities between groups and is able to reconcile the liberal framework with 
bottom-up localised patterns. Hybrid peace should not be viewed as merely a graduation 
within the liberal peace but as an approach and a model that is capable of transcending 
the institutional and constitutional peace promoted by the UN in its missions. Thus, as an 
alternative model it has the potential to go beyond what is understood as negative or 
positive peace. Nevertheless, as the hybrid peace takes into account the local context, 
which varies, it cannot be understood as a homogeneous concept. Neither is it unchanging 
as its premise describes a concept that has gone through an evolution. As an “in-between” 
form of peace, I suggest that the hybrid peace can best be explained genealogically, 
illustrated in Figure 2, through the theoretical foundations of the liberal peace together 
with contemporary understandings of bottom-up approaches of peace. 
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Figure 2. The formation of the hybrid peace. (Source: Richmond, 2006b; author) 
 
When applied in practice in a post-conflict setting, they combine to produce a new, hybrid 
form of peace. Moreover, the hybrid peace takes different forms in different contexts and 
while it has been observed to have emerged in several cases, it has not resulted in an 
equally inclusive peace.  
 
1.2.2 Future challenges and developments  
One of the main criticisms for more emancipatory versions of peace has been its relative 
vagueness. Authors have agreed that greater participation and legitimacy from local 
actors would enhance the sustainability of the peace. As argued by Paris (2006: 356), 
there is a lack of clarity on what this participation would entail or what it means for peace 
to be emancipatory. Since Paris’ critique, the concept of hybrid peace has emerged but 
has so far been characterised by a similar vagueness both in terms of how it should more 
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precisely be understood theoretically and how it could be implemented in practice. While 
this thesis has sought to fill this gap by suggesting a theoretical model and then utilising 
it in empirical analysis, the hybrid peace faces challenges that could become the focus of 
any further research on the topic.  
Firstly, this thesis has analysed the development of hybridity in cases that have 
already been subjected to peacebuilding and so far, has indeed been a result of liberal 
peacebuilding. The main challenge to tackle is the question of implementing hybridity as 
a form of peacebuilding from the outset. By understanding hybrid peace as something not 
opposed to the liberal peace but as a practice that uses both the liberal peace and the 
emancipatory peace to create a ‘hybrid form’, there is indeed potential for a new 
generation in peacebuilding to emerge. For that to happen, however, there needs to be 
greater understanding on what ‘implementing hybridity’ would entail. Very few authors 
have attempted to tackle this issue, most notably Wallis (2012) in her analysis on building 
a liberal-local hybrid in Bougainville. Bougainville is a highly interesting case, where a 
liberal peacebuilding operation has engaged with the local from the outset (Wallis, 2012: 
615). Wallis’ research supports the empirical argument put forth in this thesis that initial 
peacebuilding documents are important for the emergence of hybridity. For example, in 
Bougainville’s case, the Constitution provides opportunities for representatives of 
traditional leaders to participate in the political process and includes other locally 
legitimate practices in additional to democratically elected government institutions in the 
text (Wallis: 2012: 618). The Bougainville case thus creates scope for other such studies 
to be conducted on how a hybrid peace can be implemented from the very start of the 
peacebuilding process. As suggested by the author (2012: 631), implementing a liberal-
local hybrid could contribute to the development of a legitimate state to a greater extent 
than implementing the liberal peace and later acknowledging the local context.  
Secondly, related to the previous point on building a hybrid peace from the outset, 
there are several challenges to overcome. As argued by Millar (2014: 511), the hybrid 
peace can be administered but there is always an amount of uncertainty attached to this. 
By taking into account local legitimacy, the hybrid peace also depends on the existing 
norms that have already internalised among the local populations and then come into 
contact with liberal peace practices (Millar, 2014: 511). One of the main criticisms of the 
liberal peace is that it operates from an assumption of universality, that it is applicable to 
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all post-conflict settings, regardless of any specific circumstances. The challenge for the 
hybrid peace, then, is to avoid the same kind of universalising practices and to take into 
account the specific context in which it is being applied. In some societies, existing rituals 
and assumptions play a much larger role than in others, which means that the way the 
local communities understand institution-building differs. This, in turn, means that simply 
assuming how the local communities experience institution-building is not enough for 
establishing a successful hybrid peace (Millar, 2014: 511). It requires a much greater 
understanding from the part of the international actors on local beliefs and practices.  
Thirdly, the concept of the hybrid peace itself is not without its problems. The 
thesis suggests a distinction between inclusive and exclusive hybridity, drawing from 
previous scholars conceptualising the hybrid peace through ‘hybridity-as-emancipation’ 
and ‘hybridity-as-oppression’, as noted by Nadarajah and Rampton (2014: 57). This 
distinction can also prove to be problematic as it echoes the inclusion and exclusion 
usually attributed to the liberal peace. Yet, both forms have been observed to emerge, 
which suggests that homogenising hybridity would not do the concept justice. A future 
challenge for the hybrid peace, is therefore not only the practicalities related to 
implementing it from the outset but also avoiding the more exclusive form, which 
emerges when the established institutions are not locally legitimate. Of course, by 
emphasising inclusiveness, the communities involved should also be cautious of 
romanticising the local as it also possible that local understandings of peacebuilding can 
display excessively nationalistic or discriminatory practices and understandings. In 
addition to questions regarding implementation, one of the main challenges for the hybrid 
peace is, therefore, related to maintaining its hybridity without reproducing the 
shortcomings of the liberal peace.  
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2 Research design and methodology  
 
This section explains the research design, methodology and case selection. Moreover, the 
section will describe the specific methods that will be used and what kind of empirical 
data will be analysed. The hybrid peace remains understudied, especially when it comes 
to its potential in providing an alternative peacebuilding framework to the currently 
prevalent liberal peace. The aim of the thesis is, therefore, to firstly improve the existing 
theoretical understanding of how the hybrid peace emerges, especially in the form of a 
theoretical framework, which is currently understudied in the literature and secondly, to 
provide an empirical context in which this emergence can be understood. The research 
puzzle concerns the very essence of the hybrid peace: can the hybrid peace be understood 
as a new form of peacebuilding, capable of providing a foundation for a new generation 
in peacebuilding? For the hybrid peace to become an approach that is able to go beyond 
the liberal peace, its outcomes need to result in a self-sustainable peace. Current 
understandings suggest that this has not always been the case and conditions that can be 
described as hybrid have been observed in a variety of cases, some characterised by 
greater success than others. This led me to suggest in the theoretical framework that the 
hybrid peace is not a homogeneous concept and that it takes different forms in different 
contexts, culminating in either an inclusive form or an exclusive form. The contribution 
of the thesis is, thus, twofold. Firstly, using existing understandings on the conceptual 
framework of the hybrid peace, it seeks to enhance the theoretical framework by 
suggesting a three-pillar approach and the inclusive and exclusive forms. Since the hybrid 
peace is understood as an ‘in-between’ form of the liberal peace and the emancipatory 
peace, the three pillars are democracy, justice and legitimacy. Secondly, the empirical 
part of the thesis suggests an approach that has so far been neglected in scholarly 
literature: to understand how the hybrid peace emerges, it is necessary to firstly go back 
to the foundations of the peace processes and examine the peace agreements on which the 
subsequent peace is being built and secondly, to analyse the implementation of the peace 
agreements. So far all studies on the hybrid peace have been conducted using single case 
studies. This thesis uses a comparative study to compare the emergence of hybrid peace 
across cases. To assess the hybrid nature of the peace processes, the thesis seeks to answer 
two research questions:   
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RQ1: To what extent are the three pillars of the hybrid peace represented in the peace 
agreements of the case studies in question?  
RQ2: To what extent are the three pillars of the hybrid peace represented in the 
implementation phases of the case studies in question?  
 
Table 1. The three pillars of the hybrid peace. 
Pillar Indicator Description 
Pillar I – Democracy 1.1 Efforts are being made for the 
holding of free and fair 
elections according to a 
competitive process, which is 
characterised by political 
rights for the population. 
Pillar I – Democracy 1.2 Functioning and democratic 
government institutions are 
being established.  
Pillar II – Justice  2.1 Reforms are being established 
for the development of an 
independent judiciary, which 
operates without interference. 
Attention is being paid to the 
rule of law. 
Pillar II – Justice 2.2 Adherence to fundamental 
human rights and personal 
freedoms is ensured.  
Pillar III – Legitimacy 3.1 The rights of minority 
communities are guaranteed. 
Efforts are being made to 
further reconciliation. Gender 
equality is addressed.  
Pillar III - Legitimacy 3.2 The civil society is allowed to 
be active and operate freely 
and without interference.  
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To assess representation, the thesis uses indicators to examine each peace 
agreement and implementation document, which are summarised in Table 1 above. The 
indicators are assessed dichotomously, i.e. an indicator is either represented or not 
represented in a relevant document. If an indicator is partly present, then efforts are being 
made to ensure its representation but the success of the implementation has been limited. 
As noted in the theoretical framework, hybrid peace is usually understood to emerge when 
liberal norms go through a filter of domestic structures. The success with which the 
peacebuilding practices have managed to create a sustainable peace that is inclusive in 
nature is key to understanding how the two forms suggested in the theoretical framework, 
inclusive and exclusive hybrid peace, emerge. More top-down and narrow forms of peace 
suggest that the peace leans more towards an exclusive form, curtailing the chances of 
reconciliation. More bottom-up and both locally and globally legitimate forms suggest a 
leaning towards an inclusive form and institutional arrangements that lead to tensions are 
important for understanding why an inclusive hybrid peace is not always achieved. 
Findings summarised after each empirical subchapter identify key criteria based on the 
findings that are more likely to contribute towards each type of the hybrid peace. 
Ultimately, understanding how the hybrid peace emerges is a step towards developing an 
alternative and inclusive peacebuilding model.  
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Table 2. Variables and types of hybrid peace. 
 Kosovo BiH Northern 
Ireland 
Timor-Leste 
Intrastate 
conflict 
    
National self-
determination 
    
Liberal 
peacebuilding 
    
Ethnically 
defined peace 
agreement 
    
Reconciliation 
efforts 
Partly    
Inclusive 
hybridity 
   Partly 
Exclusive 
hybridity 
    
 
The thesis uses the small-N MSSD comparative research design, which 
demonstrates how hybrid peace outcomes differ across cases. The study examines four 
cases: Kosovo, BiH, Northern Ireland and Timor-Leste. The cases were chosen for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, there has been an ethno-nationalist intrastate conflict 
dimension in these cases. Secondly, all cases have demonstrated national self-
determination claims. Thirdly, all cases have been subjected to a liberal peacebuilding 
paradigm in an attempt to contain the conflicts. Finally, although initially displaying 
similar conditions, the cases have not all resulted in a hybrid peace that is equally 
inclusive. A comparative study can shed light on the potential causes for this variance. 
The timeframe of analysis covers the period of the peace agreements from 1995 to 1999 
and the subsequent implementation phases up until today. The availability of data varies 
in the different cases, which is why the documents chosen for analysis are ones that are 
the most relevant for understanding the post-agreement phase. Specific methods will 
include policy and document analysis to gain an understanding of how the peace has been 
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implemented in each of the case studies. The empirical analysis consists of two parts. 
Firstly, whether the three pillars of the hybrid peace are present in the peace agreements 
is examined. The purpose of this approach is to gain an understanding of the initial 
requirements set for the achievement of peace and whether the agreements contain 
elements conducive to the development of the hybrid peace. The agreements examined 
are the General Framework for Peace/the Dayton Accords (1995), the Good Friday 
Agreement/the Belfast Agreement (1998), the Agreement between the Republic of 
Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the question of East Timor/the East Timor 
Agreement (1999) and Security Council Resolution 1244 together with the Interim 
Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo/the Rambouillet Accords (1999). 
The Rambouillet Accords were not signed, however Resolution 1244 establishes self-
governance in Kosovo taking into full account the Rambouillet Accords (S/Res/1244, 
1999: p. 3), giving effect to the Accords and thus necessitating the study of the two 
documents together.  
A peacebuilding agenda that is externally introduced to a post-conflict society 
often faces legitimisation issues from the local institutions that are not able to fully 
implement the liberal peace. Institutional arrangements that are not fully accepted and 
implemented by the local setting, can lead to a situation of hybridity, where the liberal 
peace has not been successful and the local institutions are not self-sustainable. In order 
to gain an understanding of these developments and to answer the research questions 
posed above, a selection of documents from the implementation phase will be analysed. 
Each case is analysed using three documents, selected on the basis of the most significant 
achievements or developments in the peace process timeline, always also including the 
most recent documents and reports available. The indicators are assessed by looking at 
whether in the year or period in question, the indicator can be understood as represented, 
according to information presented in the documents. For Kosovo, the documents 
selected were the following: a full report on the operation plan for peace implementation 
of the Secretary-General on UNMIK on 12 July 1999 (S/1999/779), the Comprehensive 
Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (Ahtisaari Plan), fully supported on 26 March 
2007 and the 31 January 2018 report of the Secretary-General on UNMIK (S/2018/76). 
For BiH, the following documents were used: the 15 December 1995 Security Council 
Resolution 1031 on the implementation of the Dayton Accords (S/RES/1031), a report of 
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the High Representative to the Secretary-General dated 7 May 2008 (S/2008/300), a 
report of the High Representative to the Secretary-General dated 2 November 2017 
(S/2017/922). Northern Ireland documents included: the 2006 St Andrews Agreement, 
the 2015 Fresh Start Agreement and the 2016 Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report. 
Finally, the documents for Timor-Leste included: Security Council Resolution 1704, 
dated 25 August 2006, a 29 July October 2008 report of the Secretary-General 
(S/2008/501) and a 15 October 2012 report of the Secretary-General (S/2012/765), 
published right before the conclusion of the UNMIT mandate.  
 
Limitations 
On the whole, the thesis relies on empirical data available in the public domain. 
Documents from international organisations or government sources have been used 
where-ever possible. Every effort is made to ensure that the data used to assess the 
presence of the indicators is both valid and reliable. Nevertheless, there are certain 
limitations regarding the research, which I have addressed as much as possible throughout 
the thesis. Firstly, a major limitation concerns the lack of a well-established theoretical 
framework for the hybrid peace, which complicates studying the hybrid peace 
empirically. Although discussions in scholarly literature have established the concept of 
the hybrid peace, there has so far been no attempt at devising a theoretical framework or 
a greater theoretical understanding, which is necessary for the hybrid peace to become a 
serious alternative for the liberal peace. In the thesis, I have addressed this issue by  
dividing the hybrid peace into its two types, inclusive and exclusive, and drawing from 
the three-pillar approach to the liberal peace, a three-pillar approach to the hybrid peace, 
which can be used to conduct empirical analysis. This devised model strengthens the 
existing theoretical discussion and paves the way for further analysis.  
The second key limitation is the availability of data. While the peace agreements 
of all the case studies are from a comparable period of the late 1990s, specifically from 
1995 to 1999, the subsequent implementation phases are difficult to bring in line with 
each other as relevant resolutions and reports for all the cases were not all published in 
the same year. This has been addressed by selecting documents that are both relevant for 
each case studies’ peace process and that are either from the 2006-2008 period or the 
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2016-2018 period with one 2012 East Timor agreement and most up-to-date Freedom 
House data. Every effort is made to ensure that the data used is both valid and reliable. 
Thirdly, while official implementation documents are useful for providing an 
indication of how the peace is being implemented and the measures that are being 
undertaken to ensure the sustainability of the peace as well as whether the three pillars of 
the hybrid peace are represented in the official discourse, the situation on the ground can 
be difficult to deduce from these types of documents alone. For that reason, latest reports 
from the Freedom House and secondary sources will be used where appropriate to 
supplement the information provided by the documents and to provide a more thorough 
overview of the peace on the ground. Finally, while this thesis uses a comparative study 
to compare the emergence of the hybrid peace across cases and illustrate the different 
outcomes, future studies on the topic would benefit from the inclusion of even more cases 
to further analyse the emergence of the hybrid peace and its two forms.  
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3 Conflict overviews: Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Northern Ireland, Timor-
Leste 
 
This chapter provides a brief overview of the origins of the conflicts in each of the regions, 
subsequent external interventions and the road towards peace. The four case studies are 
all self-determination conflicts that have an ethno-nationalist component (Caspersen, 
2017: 5). Attempting to end intrastate conflicts between self-determination seeking 
groups and sovereign states is a common element characterising the peace agreements in 
all these case studies. The aim of this chapter is, therefore, to look at the background 
context in which the peace agreements were ultimately reached. The focus will be on 
three main aspects that are common to all the case studies: the ethno-nationalist nature of 
the conflicts, the fact that the conflicts were all characterised by violence that resulted in 
significant casualties and displaced persons and the subsequent interventions in the 
conflicts.  
 
The conflict in Kosovo  
Like many other ethnic conflicts, the Kosovo conflict can be traced back to narratives 
formed hundreds of years ago, which were resurrected in the context of a wave of 
nationalism in the 1970s and 1980s and during the 1998-1999 conflict (Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo4, 2000: 33). Kosovo was incorporated into Serbia 
in 1912, which created bitter memories for the Albanian national movement. On the other 
hand, the Serb side frequently referred to the defeat of the Serbian army by the Ottoman 
armies in battle in 1389 (IICK, 2000: 33). This battle was used in the Serbian political 
discourse to portray the persecution of Serbs in Kosovo as part of a longer historical 
narrative that began in 1389 (Bieber, 2002: 100). Nationalist tendencies ultimately led to 
the rise of Slobodan Milošević and the adoption of extreme nationalist approaches in 
official government policy (IICK, 2000: 34). In the 1970s and 1980s, Albanian 
nationalism rose with many voices calling for secession from Serbia. The Serbs, in turn, 
asserted that discrimination against Serbs was used in order to achieve the 
“Albanianisation” of Kosovo (Woehrel, 1999: 4). Yugoslav authorities criticised the 
rising Albanian nationalism extensively. In 1987, Milošević gave a speech during his visit 
                                                          
4 Hereafter the Independent International Commission on Kosovo will be referred to as IICK.  
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to Kosovo Polje on 24 April, declaring famously that “no one should dare to beat you” 
(IICK, 2000: 40).  
Following Milošević’s rise to power, Kosovo’s autonomy was eliminated in 1990. 
This was followed by discriminatory practices towards Kosovo Albanians: more than 
100 000 Albanians lost their jobs and the use of the Albanian language was restricted 
(IICK, 2000: 41). As a response, ethnic Albanians organised a movement and in 1991, 
issued a declaration of independence (Security Council Report). Another important point 
in the road towards conflict was the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 
1995. In 1996, the KLA began to claim credit for a number of attacks against Serbian 
officials (Security Council Report), which led to the Serbian authorities to declare the 
KLA a terrorist organisation and an increase in police harassment. The beginning of war 
was sparked by the killing of a KLA member Adem Jashari and his extended family by 
Serbian forces in February 1998. This was the result of a week of fighting in the 
Drenice/Drenica region, in which the Yugoslav forces used heavy artillery and left 58 
people dead (IICK, 2000: 68). As a result, village militias in various parts of Kosovo 
emerged, affiliated themselves with the KLA and organised a resistance movement 
(IICK, 2000: 55).  
Following the events in Drenice/Drenica, the conflict escalated. The KLA grew 
extensively in numbers and throughout 1998-1999, Serbian forces conducted largescale 
military campaigns in towns and villages against the KLA (Freedom House, 2004). As 
the violence grew, the campaigns were also aimed at Albanian civil populations (IICK, 
2000: 72). In addition to violence against the Albanian majority by Serbian forces, the 
KLA conducted attacks against the Serb and Roma populations (IICK, 2000: 72). All 
parties in the conflict were involved in increasing attacks against civilians, which 
ultimately prompted NATO to consider a military intervention (IICK, 2000: 72). Talks in 
Rambouillet commenced between the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, 
France, Italy and Russia, which established the presence of international military forces 
in Kosovo until a more permanent solution could be reached (Freedom House, 2004). 
However, in March 1999 Albanian forces signed the deal but Serbian forces did not 
(Security Council Report). Following Serbia’s rejection of the deal and the continuation 
of attacks against civilians, NATO authorised an air campaign against Serbia on 23 March 
1999 (Security Council Report; Freedom House, 2004). During the air campaign, more 
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than 10 000 Kosovo Albanians were killed and 2600 were abducted by Serbian forces, 
forcing another 1 million out of Kosovo (Freedom House, 2004).  
In June 1999, Resolution 1244 was approved, which established the UN Interim 
Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK). The Resolution created autonomy for Kosovo 
within Yugoslavia and facilitated the creation of a NATO peacekeeping force, the Kosovo 
Force. The post-conflict years under UNMIK were fraught with problems and the 
continuation of ethnic violence. Such was the case in March 2004, which resulted in 19 
dead, Kosovo Serb property and religious buildings destroyed and 4000 displaced people. 
As a response, Serbia strengthened its parallel institutions in Kosovo (Freedom House, 
2008a). Although the armed conflict had ended, ethnic tensions remained high and it was 
clear that the final status of Kosovo had to be determined. A UN-led process was formed 
in order to negotiate this, however the process was long and lasted throughout 2006 and 
2007. Nevertheless, the governments of Serbia and Kosovo could not reach an agreement. 
Finally, on 17 February 2008 the Assembly of Kosovo issued a declaration of 
independence and invited the EU rule of law mission EULEX to oversee the 
implementation of the Comprehensive Status Proposal (the Ahtisaari Plan) (Freedom 
House, 2009). While currently 116 countries have recognised Kosovo’s independence, 
countries such as China, Spain, Russia and Romania have not (Republic of Kosovo 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Serbia has especially strongly voiced its rejection of the 
declaration (UCDP5). Although the recurrence of violence has been avoided, tensions in 
Kosovo remain amidst the international intervention campaign and the post-conflict state 
is fragile.  
 
The Bosnian conflict  
Bosnia and Herzegovina achieved its independence from Yugoslavia in 1992. The 
declaration of independence came soon after Slovenia and Croatia had seceded from 
Yugoslavia, where nationalist parties had come to power (UCDP6). However, BiH lacked 
the kind of ethnic homogeneity that would have allowed similar events to happen there. 
Other former Yugoslavian states fared more favourably once independence had been 
achieved. Croatia offered formal support for Bosnian independence but at the same time, 
                                                          
5 http://ucdp.uu.se/#conflict/412 
6 http://ucdp.uu.se/#country/346 
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supported Croat separatism (Nation, 2003: 149). Both Croatia and Slovenia did not suffer 
from the same economic difficulties as BiH. With no significant Serb or Croat minorities, 
Macedonia’s road to independence was peaceful. What remained of Yugoslavia had 
become a Serbian national state with expansionist intentions. Independent BiH was faced 
with a difficult economic situation, ethnic tensions and potential external aggression 
(Nation, 2003: 149).  
 In 1991, Bosnia’s population was comprised of approximately 43% Bosniaks who 
are Muslim, 31% Serbs and 17% Croats (UCDP7). This meant that BiH was in a difficult 
situation amidst the growing nationalism in neighbouring republics. After the 1990 
elections in BiH, the national communities voted for their respective parties and a 
coalition government was formed. However, cooperation with the Serb Democratic Party 
and its leader Radovan Karadžić was difficult, amidst growing ethnic tensions (Lampe, 
2018). In 1991, areas with large Serb populations declared “Serb Autonomous Regions”.  
This was followed by the creation of similar Croat communities (Lampe, 2018). In 1992, 
after the European Community had recognised the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, 
BiH organised a referendum on independence. Although almost no Serbs voted, the rest 
of the electorate voted for independence, which was declared in 1992 (Lampe, 2018). The 
opposition from the Serb community was at least partly due to them not wanting to 
become a minority within independent BiH (Nation, 2003: 151).  
 While the international community recognised Bosnia’s independence, the state’s 
security situation was extremely fragile and no offers were made to address the concerns 
of the Serb and Croat communities (Nation, 2003: 153). Fighting broke out soon after the 
United States had recognised Bosnia’s independence with Bosnian Serb paramilitaries 
firing on Sarajevo (Lampe, 2018). Areas with large Bosniak populations were attacked 
both by paramilitaries and the Yugoslav army with a large amount of Bosniaks being 
expelled from these territories (Lampe, 2018). Croats also played a part both as victims 
and as the perpetrators of violence. In April, the Serbs declared the independence of the 
Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which later became known as Republika Srpska 
(the Serb Republic) (Nation, 2003: 153). By May 1992, the Serbs had gained control of 
approximately two thirds of the Bosnian territory (Lampe, 2018). Violence continued 
                                                          
7 http://ucdp.uu.se/#country/346 
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throughout the year with Serb forces fighting the Bosnian government (UCDP8). Croat 
forces who had similarly declared their own independence as the Croatian Republic of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, also fought the government in 1993 and 1994 (UCDP9). In 1994, an 
agreement was reached between the Bosniaks and the Croats to form a joint federation 
(Lampe, 2018).  
 The international community initially refused to intervene in the conflict, although 
the United Nations delivered humanitarian aid to the region and established “safe zones” 
(Lampe, 2018). It was in one of these safe zones that the 1995 Srebrenica massacre took 
place. At least 7000 people died in the massacre (Smith, 2017). While NATO had already 
launched largely ineffective air strikes against the Serbs in 1994, the attacks became more 
concentrated following the Srebrenica massacre (Lampe, 2018). The Bosnian army, 
comprised of Bosniaks and Croats, launched a massive land offensive and managed to 
regain previously lost territory (Lampe, 2018). The combination of these attacks led to 
the Serbs agreeing to participate in peace talks in Dayton, Ohio in the United States 
(Lampe, 2018). According to the Dayton Accords, 51 percent of the land would be under 
the control of the FBiH, a Croat-Bosniak entity, and 49 percent would be controlled by 
RS (Lampe, 2018). The peace agreement was signed on 14 December 1995 (UCDP10). A 
60 000-member NATO-led force was deployed to ensure the implementation of the 
agreement (Lampe, 2018).  
 The Bosnian conflict was one of the most brutal conflicts in Europe since World 
War II with around 100 000 people killed, more than 2 million people displaced and 
civilian populations suffering from atrocities such as the rape of an estimated minimum 
of 12 000 Bosniak women (Crowe, 2013: 343). The Dayton Accords ended the violence 
in BiH, however the Bosnian society today remains deeply ethnically divided and suffers 
from weak political institutions and economy.  
 
‘The Troubles’: the conflict in Northern Ireland  
The Troubles refers to an armed conflict between the Provisional Irish Republican Army 
(IRA) and the British government over a period of thirty years (UCDP11). The central 
                                                          
8 http://ucdp.uu.se/#conflict/389 
9 http://ucdp.uu.se/#country/346 
10 http://ucdp.uu.se/#conflict/389 
11 http://ucdp.uu.se/#conflict/315 
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element in the conflict was the status of Northern Ireland: the unionist and Protestant 
majority wanted to remain part of the United Kingdom and the nationalist and republican 
Catholic minority wanted to became part of the Republic of Ireland (‘The Troubles’, 
BBC). Similarly to other such conflicts, the Northern Ireland conflict is several hundred 
years old with tensions existing at least from the 17th century onwards when England 
colonised Ireland. In the 18th century, the tensions had grown to violent clashes between 
Irish Catholics and English Protestants. As a result of Catholic riots, tough regulations 
were imposed on the Catholic population (UCDP12). In the early 1920s, the northern part 
of Ireland came under British rule and the southern part remained under Irish rule.  
 Dissatisfaction with the way the unionist-dominated Northern Ireland parliament 
dealt with social issues led to violence in the late 1960s (The Troubles, BBC). By 1969, 
the IRA had become two organisations: the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA with 
the Provisional IRA campaigning for independence and eventually becoming known as 
the IRA (UCDP13). As two British policemen died from an IRA bomb in 1970, rioting in 
the 1960s became a low intensity conflict (Darby, 2003; UCDP14). In 1971, the conflict 
was already growing with intense fighting between the IRA and the British Army 
(UCDP15). Throughout the 1970s, the IRA used bombs in Northern Ireland and 
increasingly also on the mainland in the 1980s. By the mid-1990s, more than 3500 had 
died as a result of the conflict (The Troubles, BBC). Over 2000 of these people were 
civilian with around 1270 Catholic and 730 Protestant dead (Kelters, 2013). Even though 
the number of casualties decreased significantly in the 1990s, attacks continued 
(UCDP16). The violence further deepened any existing divisions between the 
communities.  
Between 1974 and 1994, several attempts were made to reach a settlement, all of 
which included power-sharing between Catholics and Protestants (Darby, 2003). The 
Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 was the first serious attempt to solve the Northern Ireland 
conflict. The Irish government gained an advisory role and the Agreement declared that 
a change to the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would only happen if the people 
of Northern Ireland consented to it (The Troubles, BBC). The Agreement encountered 
                                                          
12 http://ucdp.uu.se/#conflict/315 
13 http://ucdp.uu.se/#conflict/315 
14 http://ucdp.uu.se/#conflict/315 
15 http://ucdp.uu.se/#conflict/315 
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opposition from both sides and it was not until 1994 that the IRA declared a ceasefire, 
which lasted until 1996 (The Troubles, BBC; UCDP17). Although the ceasefire collapsed, 
the peace process continued (Darby, 2003). In 1997, the new Labour government in 
Britain allowed a previously banned Sinn Féin to participate in the talks on the condition 
that the IRA declared a ceasefire, which it agreed to do (Darby, 2003). Moreover, 
President Bill Clinton of the United States appointed US senator George Mitchell as chair 
of the talks (The Troubles, BBC). In 1998, the Good Friday Agreement was signed. 
Although the full implementation of the agreement has been a challenge, a fragile peace 
in Northern Ireland stands.  
 
The conflict in Timor-Leste  
The origins of the conflict in Timor-Leste date back to the country’s colonial history. East 
Timor is located on the eastern part of the island of Timor and was under Portugal’s 
colonial rule for more than 400 years (ReliefWeb, 1999). The first Portuguese settlement 
dates back to the mid-16th century (UCDP18). Competition with Dutch settlers led to the 
Western half of the island falling under the rule of the Netherlands with Portugal 
remaining in control of the Eastern part in mid-19th century (Central Intelligence Agency). 
Japan briefly annexed the territory during World War II with Portugal re-establishing its 
colonial authority following the end of the war (UCDP19). Meanwhile, Indonesia gained 
its independence from the Netherlands in 1949 and a civil war broke out in 1965 amidst 
growing political instability (ReliefWeb, 1999). Led by General Suharto, Indonesia 
launched a campaign to crush rebel opposition to the prevailing regime with at least 300, 
000 rebels killed as a result (ReliefWeb, 1999). The violence from Indonesia did not reach 
Timor-Leste until the Portuguese revolution in 1974 and subsequent rapid decolonisation 
(UCDP20). While Timor-Leste hoped to gain independence, General Suharto launched a 
campaign to include Timor-Leste under Indonesia’s rule (ReliefWeb, 1999). Skirmishes 
between pro-Indonesian groups and the popular socialist movement The Revolutionary 
Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin) did lead to a brief declaration of 
independence in 1975. However, Indonesia, fearing that Timor-Leste would set a 
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precedent for other separatist movements within Indonesia, invaded the island on 7 
December 1975. By 1976, Timor-Leste had become the 27th province of Indonesia 
(UCDP21). 
 Indonesian rule over the island was fraught with numerous human rights 
violations. According to human rights groups, thousands of civilians died and entire 
villages were destroyed in the hands of the advancing Indonesian army (ReliefWeb, 
1999). In addition, Indonesia commenced the repopulation of the island with Indonesians 
and banned the teaching of Timorese language (ReliefWeb, 1999). Fretilin and its armed 
grouping Falintil continued its resistance, however it was ultimately supressed as a result 
of a growing military offensive from the Indonesian army. During Indonesia’s brutal rule 
over the island between 1975 and 1999, up to 250,000 people died (Central Intelligence 
Agency).  
In the late 1980s, Falintil separated from Fretilin to form a national army. While 
the Timorese struggled against Indonesia’s occupation, the international community was 
largely disinterested and even supported General Suharto in the 1970s and 1980s, when 
Fretilin was perceived as a communist threat. The United States especially supported 
Indonesia by training their military personnel and providing military aid (UCDP22). 
Despite pulling out from Timor-Leste in 1975, Portugal began supporting the 
independence of Timor-Leste and campaigned for the involvement of the UN in talks 
between Portugal and Indonesia (UCPD23). Lobbying from Portugal, the Timorese 
diaspora abroad and rebel and civilian protests eventually managed to gain the interest of 
the international community in the late 1980s. In 1998, Indonesia experienced a severe 
economic downturn, which led to the resignation of General Suharto (ReliefWeb, 1999). 
UN-mediated talks between Portugal and Indonesia resulted in a referendum on the 
independence of Timor-Leste. Indonesia largely underestimated the extent of pro-
independence forces in Timor-Leste and did not launch any major campaigns to persuade 
the Timorese to vote for autonomy within Indonesia (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001: 23). In 
August 1999, 78.6% of the population of Timor-Leste voted for independence (UCDP24). 
Violence followed and Timor-Leste’s infrastructure was severely damaged, including 
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water supply systems, electric grids, homes and schools as a result of the activities of pro-
Indonesian militias (Central Intelligence Agency). A significant proportion of the 
population, at least 300,000 fled to the mountains or West Timor (Rabasa and Chalk, 
2001: 23). A further 1400 East Timoese were killed (Central Intelligence Agency). 
Claims from Indonesia maintained that the violence was largely between pro-
integrationist and pro-independence Timorese. The rhetoric from Indonesia emphasised 
that Indonesia’s presence was required or the two main groups in Timor-Leste would turn 
on each other. However, Falintil forces demonstrated restraint and avoided attacking the 
militias, which meant that the violence remained one-sided and severely damaged 
Indonesia’s reputation (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001: 23). Eventually, a UN-sanctioned and 
Australian-led peacekeeping force arrived to stop the violence and in 2002, Timor-Leste 
became an independent state with former leader of Fretilin Xanana Gusmão becoming 
the first president.  
 While the UN peacekeeping mission finished its mandate in 2005, Timor-Leste 
relapsed into violence in March 2006 and an Australian peacekeeping force was deployed 
(Freedom House, 2007). Clashes in the capital Dili began when a third of the East Timor 
Defense Force (FDTL) were dismissed (Freedom House, 2007). The members organised 
a strike to protest poor working conditions and ethnic discrimination by those from the 
east (the Lorosae) against those from the West (the Loromonu). Frustration with the 
government’s inability to curtail poverty, unemployment and corruption eventually led to 
the formation of gangs. FDTL clashed with the police and killed ten officers, a further 25 
people died in the unrest and 150,000 Dili residents were displaced (Freedom House, 
2008b). According to Scambary (2009: 272), the 2006 conflict was characterised by three 
main phases: 1) a political crisis and clashes among security forces, 2) an ethnic gang-
based conflict between supporters of those dismissed from the FDTL (the Petitioners) and 
supporters of the FDTL, 3) a more fluid conflict with shifting allegiances that spread 
further from Dili. During the first two phases, groups identified themselves along ethnic 
lines and campaigned for a common purpose. The third phase was based around smaller, 
family-based units in rural Timor-Leste (Scambary, 2009: 282). While president Gusmão 
retained his popularity, anti-Fretilin sentiments ran high and eventually led to the 
resignation of Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, amidst allegations of instigating the violence. 
Furthermore, a UN report published in October of the same year blamed Alkatiri for the 
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violence and unrest characterised by east-west tensions resumed. The established UN 
Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) authorised a police presence in Timor-Leste 
and restored stability (Freedom House, 2007). Currently, while Timor-Leste’s democratic 
institutions and the judicial system remain fragile, the country has made significant 
progress. Transfers of power have remained peaceful, new political parties have emerged 
and the state pursues a policy of reconciliation. Freedom House (2018) now classifies 
Timor-Leste as ‘free’.  
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4 Analysis 
The peace agreements form the foundation of post-conflict peacebuilding in each of the 
case studies. The aim of the first part of this chapter is to look at the way in which the 
peace agreements have contributed to the emergence of either inclusive or exclusive 
hybridity. The underlying foundation of the peace in the form of the peace agreements 
can provide insight into how the peace is expected to function. Have the peace agreements 
managed to create a peace that is ‘legitimate’, supported both from above and below 
(Caspersen, 2017: 10)? Why are we able to witness cases characterised more by inclusive 
hybridity than exclusive hybridity and how have the initial peace agreements contributed 
to their emergence? Can elements of the peace agreements be identified as conducive to 
a peace that can be characterised as hybrid? Of course, the success with which the 
conditions outlined in the peace agreements have been implemented varies and raises an 
important question of whether the resulting peace and thus, the peace agreement itself, is 
sustainable. In order to assess this, the peace agreements will be analysed according to 
three pillars, derived from the theoretical framework and necessary for the ‘in-
betweenness’ of the hybrid peace to emerge. These three pillars are democracy, justice 
and legitimacy. To assess the presence of these pillars in the peace agreements, a number 
of indicators are used in each of the cases. The aim of this part of the chapter is not to 
assess whether the peace agreements have been successful per se but rather to evaluate 
them based on a set of defined criteria in order to identify elements in peace agreements 
that are likely to result in a hybrid peace. For the purposes of this thesis, the division 
between ‘success’ and ‘failure’ is not of crucial importance. What is important, however, 
is the resulting peace mechanism and whether the peace agreement has provided 
conditions for the grass-roots level to participate in the peace process or whether a top-
down approach has prevailed.  
The second part of my analysis focuses on the process that followed the signing 
of the peace agreements and whether there is compliance in the implementation phases 
with the three pillars of the hybrid peace. The same set of indicators are applied to the 
case studies in order to assess the post-conflict situation. The findings are then used in the 
discussion to assess the presence or absence of inclusive hybridity. Each part of the 
analysis begins by introducing the pillar and the indicators, which are then applied to each 
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of the case studies. Finally, the findings and their implications for the hybrid peace are 
discussed.  
 
4.1 The peace agreements 
This part of the thesis uses an in-depth analysis of the peace agreements of the four case 
studies. The aim is to gain an understanding of whether the agreements contain elements 
that are likely to contribute to the development of the either two types of the hybrid peace. 
The agreements were selected based on one main criterion: as the cases are all self-
determination conflicts with an ethno-nationalist element, I require the peace agreement 
to attempt to find a solution to these types of conflicts. The agreements are all from a 
similar time period, 1995-1999 and due to their self-determination nature, are more 
comparable than other intrastate conflicts. Although the Rambouillet Accords and 
Resolution 1244, which gave affect to it in Kosovo was not a peace agreement in the very 
strict sense of the term, it nevertheless outlined a process for ending the violence and 
establishing a democratic political framework. Thus, it can be understood as a peace 
process agreement, an agreement that outlines a peace process for achieving an outcome, 
and is included in the analysis (Högbladh, 2011: 40). Analysing the peace agreements 
from the perspective of the hybrid peace did pose a challenge in that scholarly attention 
on the hybrid peace has so far not focused on the peace agreements and their role in the 
emergence of the hybrid peace. For that reason, I developed indicators for the three pillars 
of the hybrid peace, which I suggested in the theoretical framework of the thesis. The 
pillars will be introduced below.  
 
4.1.1 Pillar I – Democracy 
The first pillar, democracy, is derived from the theoretical foundations of the liberal 
peace. As the hybrid peace contains forms derived from the liberal understandings of 
peace, democratic political institutions remain crucial for its functioning. The extent to 
which the first pillar is represented in the peace agreements, is summarised in Table 3.  
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Table 3. Democracy 
Indicator Kosovo BiH Northern 
Ireland 
East-Timor 
1.1     
1.2     
 
Both indicators 1.1 and 1.2 are elements of the liberal peace framework and are derived 
from the Agenda for Peace (1992), which states that the responsibility of the UN includes 
“rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife” and 
“reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and 
informal processes of political participation”. As a result, according to the victor’s peace, 
the institutional peace and the constitutional peace, democratic institutions are necessary 
for the establishment of a sustainable peace. As discussed in previous chapters, a hybrid 
peace includes these institutions and measures in addition to the inclusiveness of the peace 
locally. 
 The language of democratisation is present in the Kosovo peace agreements. In 
Resolution 1244, indicators 1.1 and 1.2 are mentioned simultaneously in the context of 
the development of democratic institutions necessary for self-governance and include the 
holding of elections (p. 4, emphasis added). Indicator 1.1 is present to a greater extent in 
the Rambouillet Accords: the central framework of the Accords includes the “right to 
participate in free and fair elections”. Chapter 3 of the Accords focuses on elections in 
even greater detail, outlining the exact conditions that are necessary for their organisation. 
The Accords have adopted an approach that uses inclusive language with special 
emphasis on an open and safe environment with all communities included in the process. 
The most relevant conditions in terms of indicator 1.1 include assertions that elections 
need to be conducted in “an open and free political environment” and characterised by “a 
safe and secure environment”, which is “representative of the population of Kosovo in 
terms of national communities and political parties” (p. 41). At first glance, therefore, the 
Kosovo peace agreements establish an environment for free and fair elections. Indicator 
1.2 is another central element in democratising post-conflict societies. The universalising 
character of the liberal peace is evident from the way in which Resolution 1244 
establishes Kosovo’s interim administration tasked with developing democratic self-
governing institutions, which would ensure “conditions for a peaceful and normal life for 
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all inhabitants in Kosovo” (p. 6, emphasis added). The Resolution thus suggests that 
without the establishment of democratic institutions, Kosovo would not be included in 
the broader European security framework. It could be argued that stability is also a key 
issue here, as the Resolution was concerned with the maintenance of a stable international 
order in a more broader sense. For that to happen, post-conflict states would need to adopt 
certain norms and principles25. The exact conditions under which Kosovo’s self-
governing institutions were to be established, are set in the Rambouillet Accords, which 
states that the “institutions of Kosovo shall exercise their authorities consistent with the 
terms of this Agreement” (p. 9). In terms of governance, the Accords establish the Kosovo 
Assembly, the President of Kosovo and the Government with detailed provisions on their 
election and responsibilities.  
Indicator 1.1 is present to a large extent in the Bosnian peace agreement, the 
Dayton Accords. Elections are considered as crucial to the establishment of democracy 
and a representative government (Annex 3). The Dayton Accords establish the conditions 
for organising elections and emphasises a “politically neutral environment” in which 
citizens are able to “vote in secret without fear or intimidation” (Annex 3, art. I). In 
addition, indicator 1.2 provides a few noteworthy points. Firstly, the rigidity with which 
the power-sharing element is established is evident throughout the Accords. Institutions 
in BiH take into account the rights of each constituent group: the Parliamentary Assembly 
and the Presidency each consist of a set number of Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. For 
example, the House of Peoples, one of the chambers of the parliament, includes five 
Bosniaks, five Serbs and five Croats (Annex 4, art. IV). This highly ethnically divided 
approach allows little room for the inclusion of any other group. Secondly, another key 
element of the Dayton Accords is the way in which they establish a highly decentralised 
institutional structure, while at the same time remaining relatively ambiguous. The 
Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and Republika Srpska (RS), 
are largely responsible for governmental functions and institutions within their own 
constituencies. The Accords do state, however, that the central state can acquire additional 
responsibilities on the basis of “sovereignty” and “political independence” and maintains 
the right for the creation of additional institutions in order to carry out these 
responsibilities, therefore strengthening the central state (Annex 4, art. III). As a result, 
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the inclusiveness of the institutions comes into question. The political power-sharing 
structure is not undermined as such, however, the power of the entities could be 
diminished in favour of the largest group (Belloni cited in Caspersen, 2017: 82).  
The Good Friday Agreement establishes elections (indicator 1.1) in Northern 
Ireland to take place according to existing Westminster constituencies. Indicator 1.2 is 
also applicable to the Good Friday Agreement, which establishes the Assembly in 
Northern Ireland, to be elected according to the single transferable vote to ensure 
proportional representation (p. 7).  The Agreement also establishes safeguards that 
ensures that “all sections of the community can participate and work together successfully 
in the operation of these institutions” (p. 7), referring to the legislative and executive 
powers of the Assembly. What is noteworthy about the Good Friday Agreement is the 
way in which it differs from the Kosovo and BiH peace agreements, although following 
a similar power-sharing structure. While the Good Friday Agreement follows 
consociationalist practices in the formation of its power-sharing institutions, it does so 
without the allocation of ethnic quotas. Instead, seats are allocated depending on party 
strength and Ministers elected according to how many seats parties have acquired in the 
Assembly (p. 9). Defining the agreement in non-ethnic terms could potentially allow for 
divisions between groups to become less pronounced.  
The East Timor Agreement was devised with an aim of establishing an 
autonomous region within the Republic of Indonesia. The Agreement sets out conditions 
for an independence referendum and notes that if the proposed autonomy is not acceptable 
to the people of Timor-Leste, Indonesia would restore the state to its pre-1976 status. 
Timor-Leste would then, under the authority of the UN, begin a transition towards 
independence (p. 7). Nevertheless, both indicators 1.1 and 1.2 are represented in the 
Agreement as it establishes the SARET (Special Autonomous Region of East Timor), 
which would have been responsible for all matters except for defence, foreign relations 
and economic policies (p. 9, p. 10). The Agreement also establishes the Regional Council 
of People’s Representatives of the SARET as the legislative power, elected by the 
population (p. 14). The executive power was set to be exercised by a Governor and an 
Advisory Board upon the recommendation of the Regional Council of People’s 
Representatives of the SARET (p. 15). The provisions for democratic governance for 
independent Timor-Leste are set in the 2002 Constitution. 
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4.1.2 Pillar II - Justice  
Similarly to democracy, rule of law and a functioning judiciary are necessary for the 
hybrid peace. The extent to which they are present suggests whether the peace is more 
likely to more inclusive or exclusive. The findings based on the peace agreements are 
summarised in Table 4.  
 
Table 4. Justice   
Indicator Kosovo BiH Northern 
Ireland 
East-Timor 
2.1     
2.2     
 
Resolution 1244 refers to the Rambouillet Agreement when detailing the development of 
institutions for Kosovo’s self-government (p. 3). Indicator 2.1 is applicable to Chapter 1 
(Annex V) of the Rambouillet Agreement (p. 18), which establishes Kosovo’s judiciary. 
When referring to the establishment of the judiciary, the Agreement adopts a broad ethnic 
approach and follows consociational power-sharing principles. For example, at least one 
of the Constitutional and Supreme Court’s nine judges must be from each national 
community, as specified in the Agreement (p. 19, 20). This is done according to ethnic 
thresholds: 10 seats are reserved for national communities whose members constitute 
more than 0.5 per cent but less than 5 per cent of the Kosovo population and the remaining 
30 seats are left for populations whose members constitute more than 5 per cent of 
Kosovo’s population (p. 12). At the level of District and Communal courts, the Assembly 
determines their number. While the language in the Agreement is not as ethnically defined 
as it is in the case of BiH, the Agreement nevertheless notes that judges should be 
“broadly representative of the national communities of Kosovo”, therefore still remaining 
true to the general power-sharing structure (p. 20).  
 Indicator 2.1 is also applicable in the Bosnian context. When establishing the court 
structure, the Dayton Accords are characterised by the consociational power-sharing 
structure also evident elsewhere in the Accords. Thus, while non-dominant communities 
were included to an extent in the Rambouillet Accords, the Dayton Accords allocate 
members to the Constitutional Court solely from FBiH (four members) and RS (two 
members) (Annex 4, Art. VI). Additionally, the top-down structure of the judiciary is 
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evident from the way in which three members are appointed by the President of the 
European Court of Human Rights (Annex 4, Art. VI).  
 The Good Friday Agreement differs from the Kosovo and BiH peace agreements 
in that the Agreement itself does not explicitly set out conditions for the judiciary. It 
instead makes references to a separate review of criminal justice, planned to be completed 
in the Autumn of 1999. The Agreement makes frequent references to the community as 
a whole when discussing the criminal justice system and uses language that is less 
ethnically defined than in the cases of Kosovo and BiH. For example, according to the 
Agreement, the justice system is to take into account the community’s concerns and 
encourage its involvement. In addition, the aims of the justice system are explained as 
having “the confidence of all parts of the community” (p. 23, emphasis added), therefore 
using language that is more inclusive than in the previous two cases.  
 Although being applicable also to the East Timor Agreement, indicator 2.1 is 
treated more vaguely than in previous cases, no doubt owing to the still uncertain future 
of East-Timor at the time of the signing of the Agreement. The Agreement establishes the 
creation of an independent judiciary administered through Courts of First Instance, 
however the number and appointment of judges is not explicitly stated as the Courts will 
consist of as many judges “as may be required for the proper administration of justice” 
(p. 17).  
 As was to be expected, human rights as measured by indicator 2.2, are present in 
all the peace agreements of the four case studies. The way in which human rights are 
addressed and how they are prioritized, however, can have implications for the longer 
term stability of the peace. The general rhetoric of the peace agreements is favouring 
towards upholding fundamental human rights and references to human rights are frequent. 
Resolution 1244 states that the international civil presence is responsible for „protecting 
and promoting human rights in Kosovo (p. 4). Moreover, the Rambouillet Accords make 
frequent references to “human rights and fundamental freedoms” in the context of 
Kosovo’s self-governing institutions and authorities, the justice system, national 
communities and law enforcement (p. 9, p. 20, p. 21, p. 28). In addition, the Accords 
establish an Ombudsman, tasked with monitoring the rights of national communities and 
the realisation of the human rights of the population of Kosovo (p. 55). The position of 
the Ombudsman is externally implemented, in that candidates cannot be citizens of states 
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or neighbours of the former Yugoslavia and candidate lists are prepared by the European 
Court of Human Rights.  
 
Table 5. Human rights in peace agreements.  
Case study Rhetoric Institutional arrangements 
Kosovo   
BiH   
Northern Ireland   
Timor-Leste   
Source: Caspersen 2017; author.  
  The Dayton Accords also make references to human rights and includes an 
internationally recognised list of what adherence to human rights entails. This includes 
such freedoms as the right to life, freedom of expression, right to education and so forth 
(Annex 4, Art. II). In addition, the Accords establish a Commission on Human Rights, 
consisting of the Ombudsman and the Human Rights Chamber (Annex 6, Art. II). The 
Accords transfer the operation of the Commission to the central state five years after the 
Agreement enters into force, unless agreed otherwise by the Parties to the Agreement 
(Annex 6, Art. IV). The Ombudsman, therefore, remains appointed by the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) until the transfer after which the 
Presidency of BiH takes over. The Human Rights Chamber operates according to the 
general power-sharing structure of BiH with members from FBiH and RS allocated 
according to ethnic quotas (Annex 6, Art. VII). Additionally, the Accords encourage 
cooperation with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international 
organisations that specialise in the promotion of human rights (Annex 6, Art. XIII).  
 The Good Friday Agreement mentions “the protection and vindication of the 
human rights of all” when referring to past grievances and the suffering experienced by 
the population of Northern Ireland. The language is forward-looking in that it establishes 
the Agreement as a “fresh start”, through which the human rights of all will be protected, 
while at the same time acknowledging that the past legacies of violence should not be 
forgotten (p. 2). Thus, the Agreement establishes a slightly different tone from the other 
three Agreements from the beginning, attempting to speak to the people of Northern 
Ireland in relatively emotional language. Furthermore, the Agreement establishes a 
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, which would take on a more extended role 
52 
 
than the previously established Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, and 
with an aim of advising the Government, promoting awareness of human rights and other 
such matters (p. 19). The Agreement also includes provisions for the Irish Government, 
in a similar manner to Northern Ireland, with a goal of strengthening “the protection of 
human rights in its jurisdiction” (p. 19).  
 The East Timor Agreement discusses the status of human rights in Article 46 of 
the Agreement but does not establish any institutions tasked with the implementation of 
human rights. An institution similar to the ones in the other three cases, the Provedor for 
Human Rights and Justice (PDHJ), was established under Law No. 7/2004, once Timor-
Leste had become independent and adopted the 2002 Constitution. In the peace 
agreement, human rights language is confined within Article 46, which simply states the 
protection, promotion and respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms.  
 
4.1.3 Pillar III - Legitimacy 
Any peace agreement will need to have a degree of legitimacy. This is often confined to 
the parties of the peace agreement, which will ensure short-term stability but not long-
term sustainability. Peace agreements tend to focus on peace as state-building and result 
in narrow agreements that follow a standard procedure. As a result, the agreements follow 
a top-down structure and tend not to focus on the rights of individuals or smaller groups, 
which is important for local legitimacy. The extent to which this pillar is represented in 
the peace agreements can be seen in Table 6.  
 
Table 6. Legitimacy   
Indicator Kosovo BiH Northern 
Ireland 
East-Timor 
3.1 Partly   Partly 
3.2     
 
As noted by Caspersen (2017: 97), agreements based on power-sharing and autonomy 
usually tend to ensure the rights of the majority groups. These groups are usually parties 
to the peace agreement as they are the groups who are most concerned with maintaining 
their power and consequently have the ability to disrupt the signing of the peace 
agreement if their rights are not included. Minority groups, which may include such 
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groups as women or smaller ethnic communities, as can be seen in Table 7, are thus often 
excluded. 
 
Table 7. Community rights.  
 Kosovo BiH Northern 
Ireland 
Timor-Leste 
The rights of 
women 
    
Minority rights    Partly 
 
Such is the case in the Dayton Accords, which make only fleeting references to 
indicator 3.1 in a chapter on refugees and displaced persons, which ensures “the 
protection of ethnic and/or minority populations” (Annex 7, Art. I). Gender equality is 
not mentioned in the Accords beyond a list of human rights conventions applicable to 
BiH. While Resolution 1244 makes no reference to community rights, the Rambouillet 
Accords establish national community rights, which allow national communities to 
“preserve and protect their national, cultural, religious, and linguistic identities” (p. 22). 
The Accords list a number of ways in which this can be done, including displaying flags 
and symbols and establishing educational and religious institutions. The Accords make a 
separate reference to the Republic Serbia by mentioning that Serbia’s national symbols 
can be displayed (p. 23). The Good Friday Agreement similarly mentions the right to 
display national symbols but in a way which develops “mutual respect rather than 
division” (p. 21). The Agreement ensures the respect and tolerance for the various 
languages of the ethnic communities, referring to them as being “part of the cultural 
wealth of the island of Ireland” (p. 21). Special attention is given to the promotion and 
encouragement of the use of the Irish language (p. 21). The Good Friday Agreement 
differs significantly from other peace agreements in that it makes explicit references to 
gender equality. For example, the Agreement states “the right of women to full and equal 
political participation” and the British Government’s responsibility to promote social 
inclusion in Northern Ireland, “including in particular community development and the 
advancement of women in public life” (p. 18, p. 20). Additionally, the Agreement 
guarantees “equal opportunity regardless of gender” (p. 18). The East Timor Agreement 
is relatively brief on the topic of group and individual rights, noting only “the right of 
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everyone to enjoy and participate in his or her culture” (p. 20). Most notably, the East 
Timor Agreement also includes “the right of women to full and equal participation in 
political, civil, economic, social and cultural life” (p. 20).  
The notion of the civil society (indicator 3.2), considered important both by 
international peacebuilders in terms of its presence in maintaining organisations 
promoting the liberal peace agenda and by the hybrid peace in empowering women and 
youth groups and local grassroots activists, is largely absent from the initial peace 
agreements. The East Timor Agreement does not mention the civil society. The Dayton 
Accords mention NGOs but only in cooperation with international organisations and 
makes no reference to what their role would be (Annex 4, Art. V). The civil society is 
mentioned in the Rambouillet Agreement in terms of the role the international community 
is expected to play in the peacebuilding process, noting their “assistance to reinforce civil 
society” (p. 48). The Good Friday Agreement, on the other hand, again slightly differs 
from the other agreements. It is the only agreement that refers to community-based 
initiatives and their role in reconciliation practices. It draws attention to the difficulties 
faced by young people and the readiness of the conflict parties to provide assistance to 
grassroots organisations in supporting them (p. 20). Moreover, the Agreement notes that 
developing “reconciliation and mutual understanding and respect between and within 
communities and traditions” plays an important part in consolidating peace (p. 20, 
emphasis added). Finally, what is also noteworthy is the way the Agreement mentions 
services that are “sensitive to the needs of victims” and the role voluntary organisations 
are expected to play in “facilitating locally-based self-help and support networks” (p. 20, 
emphasis added).  
 
4.2 Interim findings 
Analysing the peace agreements from the perspective of the hybrid peace can allow for a 
discussion of preliminary findings. To answer the first research question, the three pillars 
of the hybrid peace were generally well represented in the peace agreements. 
Additionally, it was to be expected that peace agreements signed in the late 1990s would 
follow a fairly standard model. The language of human rights adds international 
legitimacy to the agreement and was present in at least some form in all the agreements. 
Peace understood as institution-building largely prevailed and was imposed externally, 
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facilitated by power-sharing arrangements. With a few exceptions, especially in the case 
of Northern Ireland, little room was left for community and individual rights. Yet, there 
are a few points that merit discussion in the context of the hybrid peace. 
Firstly, all the agreements in question used a form of power-sharing. At the heart 
of all power-sharing agreements is the question of power: how much political power will 
groups and elites have after the peace agreement is signed? Therefore, self-determination 
conflicts will most likely end in power-sharing agreements. It is not likely that all the 
demands of the groups will be met but since dominant groups are also more willing to 
make compromises if they know they will be able to either retain or gain power, the 
achievement of peace is also more likely. The most widely used model of power-sharing, 
consociational democracy, is also the most problematic, especially in that it allows little 
room for integration and reconciliation. Such was the case of BiH and Kosovo, both of 
which are examples of ethnically defined peace agreements. The Dayton Accords 
followed the consociational model closely: institutions were established along ethnic 
divides, undoubtedly with an aim of addressing the concerns of the three most dominant 
ethnic groups. Ethnic quotas were also allocated in the Kosovo Assembly and courts 
according to ethnic community population size. Caspersen (2017: 75) argues that a 
significant criticism of consociational democracy is that it tends to entrench ethnic 
identities. Indeed, the peace agreements accommodated the largest ethnic groups using a 
system, which expects people to vote along ethnic lines, effectively cementing the 
narratives of the ethnic groups. Such agreements do not support the emergence of any 
other identities and remain divisive even in the case of changing identities. Besides the 
East Timor Agreement, which used territorial power-sharing as opposed to political, the 
Good Friday Agreement established its institutions in electoral rather than ethnic terms, 
which was contrary to Kosovo and BiH. In addition to providing immediate stability, this 
arrangement can have the potential to add inclusiveness and flexibility to the peace 
process to a greater extent than cases that favour ethnic quotas, simply because it refrains 
from reproducing the ethnic symbols that were used during the conflict. As a result, non-
ethnic agreements have a greater potential for later sustainability of the peace since 
arrangements that are not ethnically impartial are less likely to induce reconciliation and 
depend on intra-community relations, which remain divided due to the ethnic character 
of the peace agreement. Even if the difference is largely down to the use of language and 
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it is well-known how the conflict parties will designate themselves when it comes to 
voting, less ethnically defined agreements provide a more inclusive solution to the 
complex process of drafting a peace agreement.  
Secondly, the inclusion of human rights at the level of language and even more so 
at the level of institutions is likely to ease the inclusion of human rights in the post-
agreement phase if the parties to the agreement have already agreed to their provisions 
(Caspersen, 2017: 113). Additionally, human rights serve the purpose of legitimising the 
peace agreement, both externally in the eyes of the international community and 
internally, by the conflict parties. The peace agreements strongly lean towards group 
rights rather than individual rights and often do so by vaguely mentioning the parties’ 
commitment to human rights or referring to international human rights treaties, as was 
the case with the Dayton Accords. References to ‘others’ are rare and while the rights of 
the most dominant groups are usually included, the peace agreements tend not to focus 
on the rights of non-dominant groups.  The East Timor Agreement to a lesser and the 
Good Friday Agreement to a greater extent were notable in that they included gender 
equality and the rights of women in the agreements. The agreements also often refer to 
the responsibilities of the international community to support the establishment of human 
rights institutions according to international best practice. Because the peace agreements 
set conditions for future action, the lack of attention on non-dominant groups can have an 
impact on the implementation phase of peace process.  
Thirdly, engagement with the civil society is important, however should not be 
constrained to NGOs and should include a variety of community groups, including 
women and youth groups, grassroots activists etc (The Berlin Report of the Human 
Security Study Group, 2016: 13). While supporting civil society organisations that consist 
mainly of NGOs ensures that these organisations support the activities and share the 
values of the peacebuilders, it is not likely to have an impact on the wider society as these 
NGOs do not resonate with the local populations. In the context of the hybrid peace, 
efforts should be made for including a variety of actors at the stage of peace negotiations 
that come from the grassroots community who are able to better represent the needs of 
the local communities. Including smaller groups in addition to those who are able to veto 
the peace agreement is not an easy task as it would require a significant amount of 
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compromises (Caspersen, 2017: 156). Yet, achieving local legitimacy is crucial for the 
achievement of a sustainable peace as it reduces the likelihood of instability.  
To conclude, the development of a more inclusive hybrid peace is more likely 
when the peace agreements are less ethnically defined, include individual rights in 
addition to group based rights, include the development of legitimate political authority 
and encourage engagement with the civil society, not simply at the level of NGOs but 
also at the level of grassroots activists who are able to further reconciliation. Overall, 
instead of a top-down peace agreement, what is needed is a process that is inclusive both 
locally and globally, which includes the rights of local communities, focuses on 
individual rights and refrains from entrenching ethnic narratives. The current peace 
agreements focus on stability rather than sustainability in fear of reigniting the conflict 
and while violence will most likely not recur, reconciliation remains unlikely. Both 
locally and globally legitimate peace agreements devised according to an inclusive 
process are also less likely to cause to resistance within and between the communities and 
prevent the emergence of a hybrid peace that is exclusive in nature.  
 
4.3 The post-conflict peacebuilding processes 
While assessing the peace agreements allows us to identify certain key characteristics that 
are more representative of a more inclusive type of hybrid peace at the foundation stage 
of peacebuilding, what is most enlightening in terms of the hybrid peace is the process 
that followed the signing of the intrastate peace agreements and the way in which the 
provisions outlined in the peace agreements were fulfilled. For that, a number of 
documents relevant to the implementation process were analysed using the same 
indicators that were used in the assessment of the peace agreements.  
 
4.3.1 Pillar I - Democracy  
Indicators 1.1 and 1.2 include the holding of free and fair elections and the establishment 
functioning of democratic institutions respectively. As shown in Table 8, democracy is 
indeed represented in all the cases to a greater or lesser extent. Compliance with indicator 
1.1 is slightly higher than with indicator 1.2. However, as the analysis shows, there is 
some variance in terms of the extent to which the indicators are represented in each of the 
case studies.  
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Table 8. Democracy 
Indicator Kosovo BiH Northern 
Ireland 
Timor-Leste 
1.1  Partly   
1.2 Partly Partly   
 
Kosovo  
All the documents from the implementation phase of the peace in Kosovo demonstrate 
efforts to adhere to the liberal peace framework and indicator 1.1 can generally be 
considered as applicable. For example, the 1999 Resolution 1244 implementation report 
(S/1999/779), discusses provisions set out in both indicators.  Firstly, the report notes that 
a key element in the development of “free, fair and multi-ethnic elections” is efforts by 
UNMIK to conduct “wide-ranging activities” related to the “restoration of democratic 
political organizations and institutions” with special emphasis on voter registration, 
which was considered a challenge due to the unavailability of public records (p. 17). 
Secondly, the report notes that UNMIK will establish programmes and train officials in 
order to further the development of democratic institutions, while preserving existing 
structures as much as possible (p. 16). Following Kosovo’s declaration of independence 
in 2008, an International Steering Group was formed to support the implementation of 
the Ahtisaari Plan, which outlined the status settlement conditions for Kosovo, following 
increased tensions between the Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb communities, and the 
Kosovo Assembly’s resolution declaring that the people of Kosovo supported self-
determination. Indicator 1.1 is applicable to the Plan as it requires Kosovo to “organize 
general and municipal elections” according to international standards (Art. 10, 10.5). 
Indicator 1.2 is applicable to an extent that the Plan refers to a new Constitution in 
establishing the institutions that are necessary for a functioning democracy and includes 
provisions for the content of the Constitution, including the number of seats allocated to 
each community in the Kosovo Assembly according to the power-sharing format with 20 
seats out of a total of 120 being reserved for community members (Serb, Roma, Egyptian, 
Ashkali, Bosniak, Turkish, Gorani (p. 12). Indicator 1.1 is also applicable to Kosovo as 
evidenced by the latest Resolution 1244 implementation report S/2018/76, which notes 
that in 2017 municipal elections were held in Kosovo. The elections were deemed as 
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generally competitive, however in Kosovo Serb communities, intimidation towards non-
Serbian list candidates and supporters occurred, which indicates that tensions between the 
communities remain part of the everyday. People continued to vote along ethnic lines, 
especially in North Kosovo (p. 1, p. 3). In addition, turnout in the most recent Kosovo 
Assembly elections in 2017 was a little over 41% (KQZ, 2017). This is connected to a 
general lack of political will in Kosovo to conform to the institution-building measures 
required under the liberal peace framework. Nevertheless, Kosovo’s elections are 
generally well-administered and can be considered as relatively free and fair (Freedom 
House, 2017a). Progress in implementing measures to improve the democratic framework 
of the country continues to be slow, however, and full implementation of reform to ensure 
inclusiveness remains stagnant. In other words, the mechanisms are there but 
implementation remains problematic. The government is not likely to gain a significant 
rise in approval ratings among the population (Freedom House, 2017a). Indicator 1.2 was 
not discussed in report S/2018/76, most likely owing to the fact that institution-building 
mechanisms are already in place. Thus, the main issue in Kosovo seems to be that once 
relevant democratic institution-building mechanisms have been established, the 
international community is content (Franks and Richmond, 2008: 91). How these 
operations operate and whether they do so according to an inclusive process is another 
matter entirely and not one that is receiving attention.  
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
BiH continues to struggle with the implementation of democratic reforms to an even 
greater extent than Kosovo and while the documents stress the importance of conditions 
included in both indicators, the implementation aspect remains weak. While elections are 
not discussed in Resolution 1031, which is an implementation document of the Dayton 
Accords and transfers authority from the UN Protection Force to the multinational 
implementation force (IFOR), the document welcomes an agreement put forward by the 
OSCE on the implementation of elections according to criteria set in the peace agreement, 
as prescribed by indicator 1.1 Indicator 1.1 is present in implementation report 
S/2008/300, which notes that inter-communal tensions remain to a relatively large extent 
and that this would be reflected in upcoming elections (p. 5). In addition, fewer members 
of minority communities were expected to win seats on municipal councils (p. 5). 
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Indicator 1.2 is also present in S/2008/300 as the document refers to “attempts to weaken 
progressively the institutions and legitimacy of the State” and “tensions between political 
actors”, most likely referring to resistance coming from RS (p. 20). The Steering Board 
of the Peace Implementation Council reaffirms the readiness of the international 
community to utilise “necessary instruments to counter destructive tendencies” and that 
any unilateral changes to the constitution would not be tolerated (p. 20). The latest 
implementation report S/2017/922 addresses several negative occurrences regarding 
democracy in BiH. Firstly, in a pre-election environment, “divisive, nationalistic” issues 
were brought to the forefront (p. 3). This meant that any progress made on real reforms 
was unlikely as the political environment remained ethnically hardened with ethnic 
divisions “exploited and amplified” (p. 5). For example, any agreement that would enable 
local elections in Mostar, which has not had any local elections since 2008, was yet again 
met with failure (p. 15). Secondly, the performance of legislative and executive 
institutions as prescribed in indicator 1.2, was fraught with inefficiency with little 
legislative output, stagnation in the adoption of legislation and frictional encounters 
between the State and the RS, the latter of which also continues its past practices of 
denying the High Representative access to official information (p. 13, p. 14, p. 16).  
 
Northern Ireland  
While the St Andrews Agreement and the Fresh Start Agreement do not specifically 
address elections, it is clear from the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement that 
a stable and democratic elections system in Northern Ireland is in place. Elections to the 
Northern Ireland Assembly are conducted according to the single transferable vote 
system, in eighteen constituencies with six seats per constituency (Northern Ireland Peace 
Monitoring Report, 2016: 170). Those who vote can largely be divided into two groups: 
the more conservative group comprised largely of older people who are also more likely 
to vote and the younger, more liberal group who are also less likely to participate in 
politics (Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report, 2016: 173). Similarly, 1.2 is also 
applicable to Northern Ireland. The St Andrews Agreement reiterates the commitment of 
UK and Irish governments to the “fundamental principles of the Agreement: consent for 
constitutional change, commitment to exclusively peaceful and democratic means…” and 
proposes a number of changes to the existing institutions in order to increase efficiency. 
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For example, it establishes a statutory ministerial Code, which requires ministers to act 
according to the Code. The aim of the Code is to ensure the participation and protection 
of “all sections of the community” for the benefit of the functioning of the institutions 
(Annex A, pt. 2). In addition, the Fresh Start Agreement initiates some institutional 
changes in order to improve devolution, including decreasing the number of Assembly 
members per constituency (p. 8, p. 35). While the devolved state experiences periods of 
shakiness, it remains relatively stable (Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report, 2016: 
11). How exactly Brexit is going to affect the stability of the government, remains to be 
seen but it is likely that some instability can be expected.  
 
Timor-Leste  
Indicators 1.1 and 1.2 are both applicable to Timor-Leste. The country has made 
significant progress since the 1999 peace agreement and subsequent independence in 
2002. The most recent Freedom House report (2018) has classified the status of Timor-
Leste as free due to fair elections that facilitated a transfer of power and allowed new 
political actors to enter the political system. More than ten years earlier, Resolution 1704 
(2006), which established the United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), notes 
that elections are “a significant step forward in the process of strengthening the fragile 
democracy of Timor-Leste” (p. 2). The resolution also encourages Timor-Leste to 
establish electoral legislation to ensure that the 2007 elections are free, fair and 
transparent (p. 5). Government institutions are democratic although fragile. Resolution 
1704 expressed that enhancing democratic governance would also improve reconciliation 
at the national level (p. 3). The 2012 Secretary-General Report, significant for being the 
last before the ending of the mandate of UNMIT, describes several positive 
developments: political debate is present in the parliament and both the coalition and the 
opposition participate (p. 22). It also notes that Timor-Leste is on a “promising trajectory” 
and that political will in the long-term would continue to build upon the success. The 
report remarks that citizens enjoy constitutional rights and guarantees and capacities to 
monitor the transparency of public spending have increased (p. 5, p. 6).  
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4.3.2 Pillar II – Justice 
As seen in Table 9, adherence to the rule of law (indicator 2.1) and human rights (indicator 
2.2) is slightly more problematic than the establishment of elections and democratic 
institutions. The trend of relevant mechanisms being in place but suffering from a lack of 
successful implementation continues.  
 
Table 9. Justice  
Indicator Kosovo BiH Northern 
Ireland 
Timor-Leste 
2.1 Partly Partly  Partly 
2.2 Partly Partly  Partly 
 
Kosovo  
On the whole, the implementation documents of Kosovo tend to entrench ethnic divisions 
to a similar extent as the peace agreements, owing to the power-sharing structures 
established in the peace agreements and while reforms have been made, they have been 
met with mixed success. The judiciary is indeed considered an important factor in the 
documents, as prescribed by indicator 2.1, and the need to “re-establish a multi-ethnic 
and democratic judicial system in Kosovo” (S/1999/779, p. 5), is emphasised several 
times in most of the documents. For example, the S/1999/779 connects a multi-ethnic 
judicial system to progress towards reconciliation since it would “build public 
confidence” (p. 14). The Ahtisaari Plan reaffirms the need to appoint judges and judiciary 
staff that “reflect the multi-ethnic character of Kosovo” (Art. 6, 6.6). Indicator 2.1 can be 
considered as applicable to the most recent document, S/2018/76, as it highlights 
challenges regarding integration in northern Kosovo, including lack of training, 
interpreters, a backlog of cases and incomplete translations of legal documents into 
Serbian (p. 6). Positive developments include improved structural issues within the 
judiciary and to implement the separation of powers, the Judicial Council of Kosovo 
members were required to be appointed by their peers and not by the legislature (Freedom 
House, 2017a). Financially, the institution responsible for its planning was the Kosovo 
Assembly, a change from the past when the executive powers were in control over this 
aspect (Freedom House, 2017a). However, since Kosovo struggles with the 
implementation of formal laws and practices, the success of this change remains to be 
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seen. Additionally, the slowness of administrative matters within the judiciary remains a 
problem and political interference contributes to a general lack of improvement. Indicator 
2.2 can also be considered as applicable to Kosovo. S/1999/779 notes that in order to 
implement resolution 1244, UNMIK will “adopt human rights policies in respect of its 
administrative functions” (p. 9). In addition, to ensure human rights protection, UNMIK 
will have human rights monitors and advisors as well as establish an ombudsperson 
institution (p. 17, p. 18). The Ahtisaari Plan includes human rights measures in Article 2, 
Annex 1 of the Plan, requiring Kosovo to adhere to internationally recognised human 
rights principles. The Plan also asserts that Kosovo is to “promote and fully respect a 
process of reconciliation” among the Communities (Annex 1, Art. 2), which is an 
important measure, however not likely to be achieved if enforced through the ethnic 
narratives that are in place from the conflict period. Resistance from groups to the 
internationally established institutions continues, especially from supporters of 
opposition party Vetëvendosje. Four Vetëvendosje activists were sentenced at the end of 
2017 for attacking the Kosovo Assembly building with an explosive in 2016 (S/2018/76, 
p. 6), continuing their resistance practices. Nevertheless, the report remains committed to 
promoting human rights in Kosovo and notes the establishment of small-scale human 
rights projects by UNMIK as a positive development (p. 8). Whether these projects had 
any real positive impact on the situation on the ground, remains to be seen.  
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
As transpires from the documents, the most pressing issue regarding the implementation 
of the peace agreement is the general lack of commitment to the rule of law. Therefore, 
indicator 2.1 is considered as partly applicable to BiH. Human rights developments are 
not reported on in great detail. The exception is Resolution 1031, which does not focus 
on the judiciary (indicator 2.1) but does state that “the highest level of internationally 
recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms” are important for the achievement 
of a sustainable peace and welcomes the OSCE and other human rights organisations to 
monitor the human rights situation in BiH, which establishes a mechanism necessary for 
the development of human rights (p. 2). Regarding indicator 2.1, the S/2008/300 
document discusses the national justice sector reform strategy. The readiness to adopt this 
strategy can be considered a positive development, however RS was noted to undermine 
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the agreement by pointing out technical issues, which prevented the central state to play 
a coordinating role among the entities. Additionally, the report praises the efforts of the 
international community in the justice sector reform (p. 9, p. 10). Concrete measures to 
strengthen the overall rule of law also included the adoption of a national war crimes 
strategy and the adoption of a law on aliens and asylum (p. 22). Secondly, the Steering 
Board reaffirms its commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms and notes 
that the Dayton Accords apply this commitment to both entities (p. 21). In the latest 
document, indicator 2.1 is represented but indicator 2.2 is not. S/2017/922 notes the lack 
of political will as an issue. In addition, there is a general lack of respect for the rule of 
law by authorities to disregard decisions made by the judiciary (p. 6). Political corruption 
cases remain insufficiently prosecuted (p. 14). On the whole, political interference 
remains a challenge in the most recent years and the problem of inefficiency has not been 
addressed. Resistance towards state judicial institutions is prevalent, especially from RS 
who claim that the judicial system is biased against them (Freedom House, 2017b). In 
addition, RS opposed the presence of international prosecutors and judges in the State 
judiciary (S/2017/922, p. 17). Views that the central state does not sufficiently represent 
the interests of RS exacerbates the fact that BiH remains a divided state and society with 
monoethnic regions and lessens the likelihood of reconciliation and the inclusion of all 
groups in the peacebuilding process.  
 
Northern Ireland  
The NI Executive, UK and Irish government are committed to “law and order and the 
justice system” (Fresh Start Agreement, 2015: p. 14). Justice matters in Northern Ireland 
are mostly related to the eradication of paramilitarism and organised crime. For example, 
the Fresh Start Agreement establishes a task force to tackle these issues with support from 
the UK and Irish governments (p. 16) and a strategy for the eradication of paramilitary 
groups (p. 17). Measures were implemented to speed up the criminal justice system (p. 
16). The St Andrews Agreement encourages the communities to actively support policing 
and criminal justice institutions (pt. 6). Both ‘ordinary crime’ and violent crime are in a 
downward trajectory (8.8 per cent of the population experienced crime in 2015 as opposed 
to 23 per cent in 1998), although the economically underprivileged are still more likely 
to experience violent crime (p. 24, p. 25). Indicator 2.2 is also applicable as commitment 
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to human rights is high. For example, the St Andrews Agreement establishes a number of 
strategies and legislations to further advance the status of human rights, including 
introducing an Irish Language Act, a Victims’ Commissioner and an Anti-Poverty and 
Social Exclusion Strategy (Annex B). A difficult issue in the topic of human rights is 
dealing with past human rights abuses and violence. The UK and Irish governments have 
sought to “assuage sectarian and paramilitary threats” by negotiating with the actors 
involved in the violence with an ultimate goal of reaching an agreement. Thus, the 
establishment of a universal, normative framework for dealing with past human rights 
issues is not yet on the table (Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report, 2016: 166).  
 
Timor-Leste  
Indicator 2.1 is partially represented in Timor-Leste. Rule of law remains relatively weak 
(Freedom House, 2016). However, efforts have been made since 2008 to strengthen the 
judicial system, for example through training for judges, prosecutors and other legal 
personnel (S/2012/765, p. 23). The S/2008/501 document emphasised the commitment of 
Timor-Leste to the training of judiciary personnel and notes specifically the inclusion of 
women in these training programmes (p. 10). The 2012 report also notes that further 
support should be provided to the Provedor for Human Rights and Justice and efforts 
should be made to enhance vulnerable groups’ access to justice (p. 23). In other words, 
the measures are there but compliance still needs to be improved. Indicator 2.2 is similarly 
represented: there is emphasis in all the documents on guaranteeing fundamental human 
rights and personal freedoms, however human trafficking in rural areas remains a problem 
and the government has increased efforts to tackle this (Freedom House, 2018). Similarly 
to Northern Ireland, Timor-Leste struggles with dealing with past abuses, especially 
related to the 2006 crisis (S/2012/765, p. 12). Overall, the commitment for improving the 
human rights situation has been present since the establishment of UNMIT in 2006 
(S/RES/1704, p. 3).  
 
4.3.3. Pillar III – Legitimacy 
As shown in Table 10, there is variance in the way in which this pillar is represented in 
the case studies with Northern Ireland and Timor-Leste leaning more towards inclusive 
practices than Kosovo and BiH.  
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Table 10. Legitimacy 
Indicator Kosovo BiH Northern 
Ireland 
Timor-Leste 
3.1 Partly    
3.2 Partly    
  
Kosovo  
Indicators 3.1 and 3.2 are partially applicable to Kosovo. For example, while the 
S/1999/779 implementation document establishes an implementation plan in five stages 
and describes various measures to be undertaken in Kosovo, it is mostly concerned with 
the consolidation of authority of UNMIK and the functioning of institutions. The 
document does not discuss the situation of the Kosovo communities or how they would 
be included in the peacebuilding process. In a similar vein, conditions set in indicator 3.2 
are also largely absent. Beyond making a vague remark that through UNMIK’s 
“strengthening and deepening of civil society” […] “the promotion of reconciliation at 
the grass-roots level” would be encouraged and that UNMIK would “build and support 
local human rights capacity, based on experience within Kosovo civil society”, the 
document makes no references to the inclusion of civil society (p. 18, p. 22). However, 
Annex II of the Ahtisaari Plan provides a detailed overview of the rights of communities, 
for example the right to “express maintain and develop their culture” (Annex II, Art. 3). 
The Plan requires the Government to provide assistance for the development of the 
identities of community members (Annex II, Art. 2) and establishes a Community 
Consultative Council in order to facilitate exchange between the communities and the 
Government (Annex II, Art. 4). There is no compliance in the Plan with indicator 3.2. 
Most recently, there is compliance with indicator 3.1 in report S/2018/76. Reconciliation 
efforts included UNMIK-launched projects to “support multi-ethnic women’s groups” 
and to “foster community integration through sports”, which can be considered a positive 
development (p. 8). Yet, the implementation of such projects remains top-down in nature. 
According to the document, the civil society was included in some endeavours, such as 
in an international campaign to raise awareness about gender-based violence (p. 8). 
Nevertheless, the civil society was generally not reported on in great detail, which raises 
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the question of the impact the civil society is able to have in the society, especially as a 
local agency counterpart to the liberal structures.  
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The Bosnian documents are notable in that they almost exclusively focus on institution-
building. None of the practices necessary for the indicators to be considered are 
represented are mentioned, which is similar to Kosovo but different from Northern Ireland 
and Timor-Leste, which remain more focused on community relations and reconciliation, 
even at the state level. The only reference to any of these practices in the Bosnian 
documents is in Resolution 1031 on the implementation of the Dayton Accords, which 
vaguely remarks that it is necessary “to create confidence between the communities” (p. 
5). As noted by Belloni (2001: 163), the civil society in BiH tends to be understood from 
a purely technical viewpoint with financial aid being provided but with no real effort 
being made to reduce ethnic divisions.  
Some resistance practices were included, however, especially in the latest report. 
For example, the S/2017/922 document noted the various resistance practices coming 
from RS, which Milorad Dodik reiterated his belief that RS and the Republic of Serbia 
should unite:  
“It may be time to start talking about a peaceful breakup in [Bosnia and Herzegovina]…because 
this kind of [Bosnia and Herzegovina] with massive interventionism by the international 
community has failed…” (Milorad Dodik, cited in S/2017/922, p. 23).    
A statement of this type belongs to the general rhetorical politics practiced by Dodik, with 
which he displays resistance against international or “imperial” dominance (Toal, 2013: 
198). What is apparent is that neither of the indicators are applicable to BiH. Ethnic 
tensions remain high and there is no reconciliation. No efforts are being made by political 
leaders to promote reconciliation, they instead focus on ethnic cleavages, which is 
evident, for example, in the education system, where Bosniak and Croat children attend 
separate classes with different curricula in schools (Freedom House, 2017b). The rights 
of minorities are not fully guaranteed and NGOs remain vulnerable to political 
interference and have little impact on political decision-making (Freedom House, 2017b).  
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Northern Ireland  
On the whole, indicators 3.1 and 3.2 are applicable to Northern Ireland. The Fresh Start 
Agreement notes the need for reconciliation in several parts of the document, for example 
to “promote the interests of the whole community towards the goals of reconciliation” (p. 
38). Special attention is being given to respecting linguistic diversity, especially the Irish 
language (p. 38). Gender equality is guaranteed under law (Freedom House, 2004). 
Female representation has increased in the Northern Ireland Assembly but is behind 
Scottish and Welsh institutions (Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report, 2016:  12). 
Yet, female representation has been steadily increasing since the peace agreement and 
gender equality issues are being addressed (Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report, 
2016: 133). While there are problems with community relations, especially with regards 
to persisting mutual distrust among the two majority communities, support and 
preferences for living in an integrated community are in a slight downward trend, support 
for mixing remains relatively high  with around 70% of respondents to the Northern 
Ireland Life and Times Survey saying they would prefer to live in a mixed-religion 
neighbourhood and 80% would prefer to work in a mixed-religion workplace (Northern 
Ireland Peace Monitoring Report, 2016: 139). The civil society, as represented by 
indicator 3.2, is active in Northern Ireland, although there have been some concerns over 
funding. As noted by the Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report (2016: 141), the civil 
society has been contributing to peacebuilding with support from the EU Peace 
Programme. Funding through that programme, however, has been diminishing and Brexit 
has resulted in uncertainties regarding any future EU funding. The Fresh Start Agreement 
suggested a “compact civic advisory panel”, which would include civic voices „in relation 
to key social, cultural and economic issues” (p. 38). This would replace a post-agreement 
Civic Forum, which included representatives of civil society organisations. According to 
the 2016 report (p. 141), the new proposal did not manage to gather a lot of faith from 
civil society activists who believed the new panel to be politically motivated. 
 
Timor-Leste  
There is compliance with indicators 3.1 and 3.2. Minority rights are guaranteed and ethnic 
minorities are well represented in politics (Freedom House, 2018). A process of national 
reconciliation is underway with all three documents noting positive developments in the 
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field. The language remains relatively top-down in that regard, however, with Resolution 
1704 noting that the efforts of the Timorese in “bringing about a process of national 
reconciliation” is being supervised by UNMIT (p. 3). However, Timorese political leaders 
seem committed to fostering dialogue and reconciliation. For example, the S/2008/501 
document notes the role of a “mechanism for fostering political dialogue and national 
reconciliation” (p. 15). In 2012, then Prime Minister Gusmão reaffirmed the importance 
of reconciliation between communities in the peace process (S/2012/765, p. 17). Both the 
2006 and 2008 documents noted efforts “to encourage women to participate in conflict 
mediation” activities with the communities (S/RES/1704, p. 3, S/2008/501, p. 9). The 
civil society is active, especially in the area of women’s human rights (S/2008/501, p. 
14). The 2012 report states that village leaders organised democratic governance forums 
to “facilitate grass-roots dialogue and civic participation” (p. 4). While UNMIT and the 
international community has supported formal reconciliation practices, Timor-Leste is 
also known for its own customary reconciliation practices, namely the nahe biti. This is 
a local practice meant for both family and society members, which aims at establishing 
stability in the social order (Babo-Soares, 2004: 30). The nahe biti is a long-term 
understanding of peace and stability, an all-inclusive process of customary reconciliation 
and now also widely accepted and encouraged by Timorese political leaders (Babo-
Soares, 2004: 22, 30). This practice, along with other efforts at fostering dialogue between 
communities has greatly helped Timor-Leste on its road towards a more inclusive peace.  
 
4.4 Discussion  
What immediately transpires from the case studies is the different degrees to which the 
three pillars have been represented in the case studies. As noted in the interim findings 
section of the thesis, the three pillars were generally represented in the case studies 
although Northern Ireland and Timor-Leste demonstrated greater compliance with the 
third pillar, legitimacy, which also indicates why the two case studies are leaning more 
towards an inclusive hybrid peace than an exclusive one. To answer the second research 
question, the three pillars of the hybrid peace were also mostly present in the 
implementation mechanisms but implemented with fewer deficiencies in some cases than 
others. The first two pillars, democracy and justice, were either present or partially present 
in most of the case studies. Compliance with the third pillar, legitimacy, was again more 
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problematic. While Northern Ireland and Timor-Leste were more inclusive in that regard, 
the pillar was only partially applicable in Kosovo’s case and largely not applicable in the 
case of BiH.  
BiH and Kosovo as a whole struggle with the implementation of various aspects 
of the three pillars. The cases remain deeply divided ethnically and peacebuilding has 
been slow and difficult, especially in the case of BiH, which is a heavily decentralised 
state. The creation of a successful multi-ethnic state has not transpired and the Dayton 
Accords have resulted in a situation, where the established ethnic quotas do guarantee 
representation in numbers but not reconciliation or dialogue. The overarching narrative 
of multiethnicity has come at the expense of other identities that stand outside the “grand 
narrative” (Keranen, 2014: 133). When it comes to Republika Srpska, actors from that 
region seem to view the efforts made by the international community as undermining 
their right to self-determination. These findings are in line with Keranen’s (2014: 135) 
arguments on how the Bosnian Serb (and also Bosnian Croat) communities tend to view 
the multiculturalism advocated by the international actors as favouring the Bosniak 
community. This focus on ethno-national aspects has also resulted in a situation, where 
the civil society is used to shape the society in a direction suitable for the international 
actors, rather than as a powerful tool for promoting change from within (Kappler and 
Richmond, 2011: 265). Additionally, externally implemented institutions can result in a 
situation where the local actors are able to blame the international community for any 
shortcomings related to state-building while continuing with their polarising discourses.  
Decentralisation has also proven to be problematic in Kosovo. The Ahtisaari Plan 
gave competencies to communities to govern their own affairs, however this has not 
resulted in the creation of a successful multi-ethnic state. This is especially evident 
between the two dominant groups, the Kosovo Albanians and the Kosovo Serbs, with 
popular movements such as Vetëvendosje using existing ethnic cleavages to demonstrate 
resistance towards the international presence. As noted in the interim findings, this is also 
why enabling engagement with the civil society not only at the level of state-sponsored 
NGOs but through youth groups, women’s groups and grassroots activists is necessary. 
If there is a lack of common spaces for dialogue, then the polarisation of discourses will 
continue. Moreover, the empowerment of NGOs can have unintended negative 
consequences. One of the more difficult issues for the hybrid peace is the question of how 
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to avoid implementing it from a top-down perspective, effectively rendering it a slightly 
more inclusive version of the liberal peace. Externally sponsoring NGOs without giving 
the citizens opportunities to be the drivers of projects that are developed according to their 
needs is nothing but a top-down practice in disguise, framed by a rhetoric of local 
empowerment (Belloni, 2001: 174).  
Timor-Leste is a case that has made remarkable progress, both in the adoption of 
elements of the liberal peace and the emancipatory peace, and demonstrates a leaning 
towards inclusive hybridity. It is also a case, which merits further study, especially with 
regards to furthering the current knowledge of how the hybrid peace could be 
implemented from the outset. While the East Timor peace agreement did demonstrate a 
willingness to adopt more inclusive elements, the 2002 Constitution which was adopted 
following the independence of Timor-Leste notes that the state should “recognise and 
value the norms and customs of Timor-Leste that are not contrary to the Constitution and 
to any legislation dealing specifically with customary law” (Part I, Section 2, pt. 4). 
Elsewhere, the Constitution enables the state to “assert and value the personality and the 
cultural heritage of the East Timorese People” (Part I, Section 6). As argued by Wallis 
(2012: 752), the state has used these provisions to actively engage with the local context. 
Including local practices in state institutions can effectively increase the legitimacy of the 
existing institutions since people are more likely to participate in institutions that they are 
able to identify with and thus also develop further identification with state practices if 
they include familiar practices (Wallis, 2012: 753). The progress made by Timor-Leste 
also suggests that the hybrid peace is not opposed to the liberal peace. On the contrary, it 
encourages the liberal to engage with the local. The form of hybridity that has emerged 
in Timor-Leste might not closely follow a liberal peace model as envisioned by 
international actors but it is certainly more locally legitimate (Richmond, 2015: 125). This 
is connected to the three-pillar approach that has been suggested in this thesis, which is 
also based on the idea of engagement, a combination or a hybrid of the liberal and the 
local, which increases the legitimacy of institutions at the local level without losing the 
legitimacy at the global level.  
Northern Ireland was characterised by a more inclusive hybrid type than the other 
cases, owing partly to the slightly different way the Good Friday Agreement was 
compiled and partly to implementation mechanisms that favoured more emancipatory 
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approaches. That is, of course, not to say that Northern Ireland is a complete success story. 
On the contrary, the society still faces many struggles, especially in the path towards 
reconciliation, however, efforts are being made to improve dialogue across the 
communities. In addition, Northern Ireland does not have any hostile neighbours or 
spoilers who would have greatly complicated the peace process. In that sense, Northern 
Ireland demonstrated a favourable environment for peace implementation (Mac Ginty, 
2009: 704). Yet, as noted previously in the thesis, the fact that Northern Ireland, although 
having made considerable progress, is still facing problems suggests that the achievement 
of an inclusive hybrid peace is a very ambitious project. There are historical legacies and 
past abuses associated with every post-conflict setting that cannot and should not be 
trivialised. Reconciliation cannot be forced from the top-down, which is why enabling 
the local level to produce its own forms of furthering dialogue and reconciliation practices 
is important for the development of a more inclusive peace. What the Northern Ireland 
experience also suggests is that although the achievement of a completely inclusive 
hybrid peace after an intrastate conflict is unlikely, the inclusion of more emancipatory 
elements in addition to elements from the liberal peace in peace agreements and peace 
implementation mechanisms is likely to increase the sustainability of the peace. In that 
sense, the three-pillar model is a useful tool for bringing together the two approaches and 
analysing the situation from a hybrid perspective. Nevertheless, utilising a model that 
includes local practices needs to recognise that not all local practices are democratic or 
inclusive. Some practices can be predatory and by including the local in state practice, 
the very communities the hybrid peace is aiming to reach would suffer (Wallis, 2012: 
759). Thus, the local should not be romanticised uncritically, it should be approached 
with pragmatism, which the Timor-Leste state has so far done relatively successfully.  
The findings suggest that there is indeed variance in the extent to which the three 
pillars are represented in the case studies. The analysis also indicates that greater 
compliance with the elements suggested in the three pillars of the hybrid peace, both at 
the stage of signing the peace agreements and later at implementing them, also leads to a 
more inclusive than exclusive hybrid peace. To increase prospects for generalisation, 
further research on the hybrid peace could focus on including more cases into the analysis 
in order to identify further patterns across cases. 
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Conclusion  
Although the liberal peace remains as the most preferred form of peacebuilding today, 
important critical debates have emerged to challenge this dominant approach. These 
debates have highlighted the top-down nature of the liberal peace and its tendency to 
focus on institution-building rather than reconciliation or the needs of those subjected to 
peacebuilding. This can have a negative effect on the stability of the peace as the 
narratives derived from the conflict are maintained. The cases of Northern Ireland and 
Timor-Leste show that encouraging dialogue and taking into account local perspectives 
of peacebuilding can have a positive impact on the inclusiveness of the peace. On the 
other hand, cases such as BiH and Kosovo demonstrate a greater lack of local legitimacy 
and more rigid top-down institution-building structures. A common factor in all these 
cases is a form of peace that critical scholars on the liberal peace have noted as the hybrid 
peace, which is usually understood as a practice that combines both internal and external 
peacebuilding processes. In other words, the hybrid peace is an ‘in-between’ form of 
peace, characterised by liberal-local interactions and varying interests between the actors 
involved in the peacebuilding process. Nevertheless, it has been unclear how these forms 
of peace emerge and whether it would be possible to implement the hybrid peace from 
the outset to a post-conflict setting. 
 This thesis has sought to analyse the emergence of the hybrid peace and its 
potential in becoming a new generation of peacebuilding. The current conceptual 
framework of the hybrid peace suggests that although there is an understanding in the 
academic literature on what the concept of the hybrid peace entails and the fact that it is 
indeed present in a variety of case studies, the model itself is lacking a clear framework 
for analysis. To address this shortcoming, I suggested a three-pillar model for the hybrid 
peace, which sought to bring together both liberal and emancipatory understandings of 
peacebuilding and represent the ‘in-betweenness’ of hybridity. The first two pillars, 
democracy and justice, are derived from the current understanding among hybrid peace 
scholars that a successful hybrid peace incorporates best practices from the liberal peace 
with the rule of law and functioning institutions being crucial to its success. The third 
pillar, legitimacy, is concerned with the extent to which bottom-up practices, represented 
by the civil society and the inclusion of minority groups in the analysis, are included in 
the peacebuilding process. The aim of introducing the three-pillar model was not only to 
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enhance the current theoretical framework but to also provide scope for further empirical 
analysis on how the hybrid peace is likely to emerge.  
 Previous analyses as well as this one suggest that the hybrid peace is not a 
homogenous concept. Interactions between the external peacebuilders and the local actors 
are likely to produce various outcomes, not all of them positive. As the hybrid peace seeks 
to transcend the boundaries between local and international understandings of 
peacebuilding, a more inclusive peace is also more likely to be sustainable. Therefore, I 
suggested a distinction between an inclusive hybrid peace and an exclusive hybrid peace. 
In the analysis, the more compliance there is with the three pillars of the hybrid peace, 
the more likely it is that the resulting hybrid peace is inclusive. Or in other words, the 
more top-down the peace implementation mechanisms, the less inclusive the hybridity. 
The thesis used a comparative study of four case studies, Kosovo, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Northern Ireland and Timor-Leste, to gain an understanding of the extent 
to which the three pillars are represented in the case studies and why the hybrid peace 
differs across cases. To test the three-pillar model, I analysed both the peace agreements 
of the cases studies as well as documents from the implementation phase.  
 The findings of the thesis suggest that the peace agreements do indeed have an 
impact on how the hybrid peace emerges. One of the most important findings of the thesis 
is that although the peace agreements follow a fairly standard model, the more the peace 
agreement is defined along ethnic lines, the less likely it is that an inclusive hybrid peace 
will emerge. The main reason for this is that more ethnically defined peace agreements 
tend to entrench existing ethnic divisions and are thus less likely to foster reconciliation. 
Ethnically defined agreements, in turn, are more likely in conflicts characterised by 
significant tensions and violence between ethnic groups. These types of agreements, 
following the consociational model, attempt to address the demands of the most dominant 
groups and frequently make use of ethnic quotas. Therefore, the more violent the conflict 
and the more it is characterised by ethnic divisions, the more likely it is that consociational 
democracy will be used in solving it. Such was the case in Kosovo and BiH, where the 
peace agreements were defined along ethnic lines and it also transpired from the 
implementation of these agreements, that reconciliation had not happened and wartime 
narratives were widespread. These findings thus suggest that the successful 
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implementation of an inclusive hybrid peace following a violent ethnic conflict is 
therefore also less likely. 
 From a more positive angle, the findings also suggested that although it is unlikely 
that the hybrid peace can currently be implemented from the outset as it requires the initial 
peace agreements to be more inclusive and adhere to the third pillar of the hybrid peace, 
the inclusion of certain emancipatory elements in both the peace agreements and the 
implementation mechanisms can make a difference. The cases of Northern Ireland and 
Timor-Leste demonstrated that a greater focus on individual rights, including those of 
women, developing locally legitimate political authorities and engaging the grassroots 
community in the peacebuilding process can have a positive impact on the sustainability 
of the peace. Thus, the analysis suggests that some cases do indeed demonstrate a greater 
likelihood of achieving an inclusive hybrid peace, or in other words, the greater the extent 
to which the three pillars of the hybrid peace are represented, the more likely 
inclusiveness becomes. Although the implementation of the hybrid peace is currently 
problematic and it is too early to talk about it as a new generation in peacebuilding, it 
does have the potential of increasing bottom-up approaches in peacebuilding processes. 
A greater focus on reconciliation and local legitimacy is a development in the right 
direction and can have a positive impact on the sustainability of peace in post-conflict 
settings.  
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